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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78A-3-
102(3)U), Utah Code Ann. (2009, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Mr. Seegmiller's legal 
malpractice claims against defendants Daniel J. McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
were not assignable as a matter of law under the facts of the case. The standard of review 
for conclusions of law is the correction-of-error standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
936 (Utah 1994); Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 199 UT 49, 980 P.2d 208, 
209 (Utah 1999) [R. 4040-4070.] 
2. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to allow Mr. Seegmiller to be 
substituted as the plaintiff in the action, to allow him to continue pursuit of the legal 
malpractice claims in his own name. The standard of review for conclusions of law is the 
correction-of-error standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); [R. 4040-
4070.] 
3. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the insurance policies 
issued by defendant Houston Casualty Company did not provide coverage to Mr. 
Seegmiller with respect to the $1,041,275.34 judgment for negligence issued against Mr. 
Seegmiller in Civil No. 070916209 on June 7, 2012. An interpretation of a contract 
Comptonl6-Appeal.Brief 8 
presents a question of law for which the standard of review is the correction-of-error 
standard. See Richardson v. Hart, 2009 UT App 387, ~ 6, 223 P.3d 484. [R. 4935-5021.] 
4. Whether the District Court erred holding that plaintiffs, as judgment creditors, 
are not entitled to coverage pursuant to Section VIII(i) of the insurance policies issued by 
defendant Houston Casualty Company with respect to the direct action brought against 
Houston Casualty Company on t:4e basis of the judgment for negligence entered against 
Mr. Seegmiller in Civil No. 070916209 on June 7, 2012. An interpretation of a contract 
presents a question of law for which the standard of review is the correction-of-error 
standard. See Richardson v. Hart, 2009 UT App 387, ~ 6,223 P.3d 484. [R. 4935-5021.] 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought the present case as a civil action. The claim against defendants 
Daniel J McDonald, Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC is for legal malpractice. The claim against 
Houston Casualty Company is a claim for breach of contract relative to an insurance 
policy. On September 10, 2015, the District Court entered an order denying plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment as to the insurance policy, granting defendants' motions 
for summary judgment in part and dismissing plaintiffs' claims in their entirety. 
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• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 14, 2007, plaintiffs John Simcox, William Compton and Saltair 
Investments, L.L.C. ("Saltair") filed two lawsuits in Third District Court against the real 
estate agent Robert Seegmiller ("Seegmiller") and his broker Prudential Utah Real Estate 
("Prudential") related to Seegmiller's involvement in two real estate transactions with the 
plaintiffs. [R. 4353-4407.] 
Defendant Daniel McDonald ("McDonald") of the law firm of Smith Hartvigsen 
met to discuss the two lawsuits with Seegmiller and Bruce Tucker as the principal of 
Prudential on November 19, 2007. There were a number of inherent conflicts of interest 
between Seegmiller and Prudential as prospective clients of McDonald and Smith 
Hartvigsen. Those conflicts included the question as to whether Seegmiller had a 
contractual obligation to pay for the legal fees incurred by Prudential in the course of its 
defense of the action as well as any damages suffered by Prudential in the litigation. 
Those conflicts also included the cost benefit analysis for each of the parties with respect 
to the question of whether or not the claims should be reported to Houston Casualty 
Company, the carrier of the insurance policy purchase by Prudential with respect to 
which Mr. Seegmiller had made periodic contributions with regard to his own insurance 
coverage under the policy. [R. 4313-4337 .] 
In the course of representing both Seegmiller and Prudential, McDonald and Smith 
Hartvigsen committed legal malpractice in several particulars. McDonald and Smith 
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Hartvigsen breached their fiduciary duty of representing Seegmiller with undivided 
loyalty. The legal representation by McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen was also below the 
standard of care. [R. 3242-3291.] 
Ultimately, Seegmiller became disillusioned with the legal process not meeting the 
expectations that had been created by McDonald, and McDonald was forced to withdraw 
from further representation. Before withdrawing, McDonald made an ineffective attempt 
to report the claim to Houston Casualty Company. As a result of a lack of follow through 
• 
• 
on the part of McDonald and the defendants, Houston Casualty Company improperly • 
denied coverage on the basis of late reporting, failing to properly construe their own 
policy as a claims-made policy under Utah law. [R. 3242-3291.] 
Seegmiller and Prudential both retained different counsel in the case thereafter and 
continued to defend the action. On June 7, 2012, pursuant to plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment, a judgment for negligence was entered against Robert Seegmiller in 
Civil No. 070916209. [R. 4278-4309, Exhibit 14, attached as Exhibit "D."] 
After extended negotiation with Robert Seegmiller, the plaintiffs and Seegmiller 
entered into a potential settlement that involved the assignment of claims by Seegmiller 
to the plaintiffs, including the claims against defendants McDonald, Smith Hartvigsen, 
and Houston Casualty Company. Based on the voluntary assignment by Seegmiller, the 
plaintiffs filed the present action against McDonald, Smith Hartvigsen, and Houston 
Casualty Company as Civil No. 130906137. The contract expressly provided for 
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• 
• 
Seegmiller to pursue the claims in his own name, if required by the courts. (R. 474-4105, 
Exhibit 2, attached as Exhibit "C."] 
In the context of Civil No. 130906137, Houston Casualty Company has 
acknowledged that its policies were, in fact, claims-made policies. However, Houston 
Casualty Company now denies coverage on the basis of their construction of various 
others provisions of the policy. Houston Casualty Company's arguments reflect a legally 
incorrect construction of the express provisions of the insurance policies. [R. 4111-4125, 
4935-5021 , 5964-6026.] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Whether or not a legal malpractice claim may be voluntarily assigned by the 
injured client of an attorney and/or law firm is a matter of first impression for the Utah 
Supreme Court. See Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 199 UT 49, 980 P.2d 
208, 210 (Utah 1999). While the Utah Federal Court and one or more district courts have 
previously ruled on the issue based on their belief that the Utah Supreme Court would be 
in accord with their decision, this case appears to be the first opportunity requiring the 
Utah Supreme Court to directly address the issue. In Snow, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a legal malpractice claim may be transferred through the involuntary process of 
execution on a judgment. Id. 
This case is uniquely suited for a decision by the Utah Supreme Court because it 
involves actual malpractice. As Judge Maughan pointed out in orally announcing his 
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decision, Daniel McDonald and Smith Hartivigsen undertook to represent Robert 
Seegmiller and Prudential Utah Real Estate ("Prudential") without providing a written 
disclosure or obtaining a written waiver of the conflict of interest that existed between the 
two parties. [R. 7454-7724, Transcript, pp. 251:21-252:2, 260:18-261:2, 268:12-16.] 
While Mr. Seegmiller would have directly benefited from the insurance coverage to 
which Prudential was entitled with respect to the negligence claims against it, Mr. 
McDonald negligently advised Mr. Seegmiller with regard to his own insurance coverage 
and never suggested to Mr. Seegmiller that Mr. Seegmiller had a distinct interest in 
reporting the claims against Prudential. As a result of Mr. McDonald's legal malpractice, 
the parties failed to timely report the claim to the insurance carrier, because of 
Prudential's concerns that their insurance coverage in the future might be affected by a 
claim, and a judgment for $1,041,275.34 was subsequently entered against Mr. 
Seegmiller for negligence. 
In the present case, the plaintiffs have an actual judgment against Mr. Seegmiller. 
If they executed upon that judgment and through execution obtained Mr. Seegmiller's 
legal malpractice claim against Daniel McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen, then the transfer 
of the claim to the plaintiffs would be entirely legal under the Utah Supreme Court's 
holding in Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, supra. Consequently, it seems 
unreasonable that the courts would not allow the injured client to transfer the claim by a 
• 
• 
voluntary assignment when the same transfer could be effected through an involuntary • 
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execution. In particular, since the involuntary execution would not extinguish the entire 
judgment against Mr. Seegmiller, refusing to allow a client with a judgment entered 
against him to make a voluntary transfer to the judgment creditor seems particularly 
likely to cause additional harm to the client. In Snow, the Utah Supreme Court decided 
against a policy that would be unfair to a client. Thus, permitting the voluntary 
assignment in the present case seems to be consistent with Snow. The District Court' s 
refusal even to allow Seemiller to be substituted as plaintiff to pursue the claim in his 
own name seems inconsistent. 
Since discovery in the case has been substantially completed, the interests of 
judicial economy suggests that the case go forward in its current posture, rather than 
requiring the parties to repeat the process after the claims are filed in Mr. Seegmiller's 
name. In fact, since the parties anticipate that Mr. Seegmiller will file and pursue the 
claims in his own name, consistent with the holding in Snow, the District Court's decision 
to prohibit a substitution of the parties may also be treated as reversible error in order to 
better serve the client and the interests of judicial economy. 
The rationale employed by other courts to deny the right of an injured client to 
voluntarily assign his legal malpractice claim has rested upon dubious public policy 
arguments which can be dispelled in the context of this case. One of those issues is 
whether there is a need to prohibit assignment to protect the sanctity of the attorney-client 
privilege. In the present case, depositions of the relevant attorney and client have already 
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been taken, meaning that there is no attorney-client privilege available to be protected. 
This raises the question as to whether there should be an obligation on the part of an 
• 
objecting attorney to bring a timely motion in order to avail such a public policy • 
consideration. Likewise, other public policy considerations are straw man arguments, 
with respect to which the refusal to permit a voluntary assignment does not actually 
change the outcome. Because of the right of the client to bring such claims in his own 
name, the impact on the attorney-client privilege and other effects are the same whether 
or not voluntary assignment of the claims is allowed. 
Arguments concerning the reliability of testimony go to the weight of the evidence 
only. Considering the credibility of Mr. Seegmiller as a client who has assigned his claim 
is something that can easily and appropriately be handled by the trier of fact. This is true 
in the case of any assignment of claims and does not appear to be unique to attorneys in 
any respect. Therefore, such a policy consideration does not seem to be an appropriate 
justification for shielding attorneys from assignment of claims against them for actual 
malpractice. 
In fact, the proof of malpractice in the present case does not depend upon any 
testimony from Bobby Seegmiller. There is adequate documentation in the record to 
establish Mr. McDonald's malpractice. Mr. McDonald's own deposition testimony 
further confirms the details of his legal malpractice. Therefore, where none of the policy 
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• 
• 
• 
considerations raised actually impact the ability of the parties to try the case, a blanket 
policy against voluntary assignment seems particularly over reaching in scope. 
With regard to the claims against HCC, Prudential purchased insurance from HCC 
to cover itself as a real estate broker and the real estate agents working for the company. 
From the proceeds of every sale, a portion of the commission earned by Mr. Seegmiller 
was paid to Prudential as his share of the cost of the insurance policy maintained for him 
by his brokerage. The identification of the insurance policies applicable at the time of the 
incident in question (the "Policy") is not in dispute. 
The first section of the Policy defines the scope of coverage as follows: 
"I. COVERAGE. Coverage-Payment and Claims Made Provision. The 
Company shall pay on behalf of the Insured any Loss and Claim Expenses in 
excess of the Deductible amount and subject to the Limit of Liability as the 
Insured acting in a profession described in Item 3 of the Declarations shall 
become legally obligated to pay for Claim or Claims first made against the 
Insured during the Policy Period by reason of any Wrongful Act by an Insured 
provided always that the Insured has no knowledge of such Wrongful Act prior 
to the Inception Date of this Policy and further provided that such Wrongful 
Act took place subsequent to the Retroactive Date set forth in Item 8 of the 
Declarations." 
( emphasis added). There is nothing in the coverage provision of the Policy that uses the 
word "solely" or otherwise supports the District Court's ruling that the Policy did not 
cover the judgment against Mr. Seegmiller. The judgment is for negligence relative to 
Mr. Seegmiller's duties acting within the insured profession. Therefore, the judgment is 
covered. 
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Item 3 of the Declarations is defined in Endorsement No. I to the Policy. It 
defines the Insured's profession as "Solely in the performance of services as a Real Estate 
• 
• 
Agent/Broker of non-owned property, for others for a fee." The Memorandum Decision • 
granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was issued by the Honorable Kate 
Toomey in Civil Case No. 070916209 on October 18, 2011. It clearly describes 
Seegmiller's role as a real estate agent working for a fee relative to the prospective 
purchase of real estate by plaintiffs from a third party. Seegmiller had no ownership in 
the Herriman Property, and he received a fee from the seller for his services. The 
Judgment rendered clearly matches the definition of the insured profession. 
Item 3 in Endorsement No. I is only the definition of the profession as a whole. It 
limits coverage to a person acting as a real estate agent. It does not eliminate coverage 
for a real estate agent if he has a conflict of interest, as decided by the District Court. 
Even under that misconstruction, the Policy still provides coverage. It is clear that 
Mr. Seegmiller was acting as a real estate agent. It's also clear that the Judgment entered 
against Seegmiller is solely for the violation of specific duties he owed as a real estate 
agent. The Judgment wasn't entered on the basis that Seegmiller was acting as the 
plaintiffs real estate agent, but that because Seegmiller was a real estate agent he owed 
specific duties to plaintiffs whether he was their real estate agent or not. Since the Policy 
only defines the Insured' s profession with the phrase "as a real estate agent" without 
requiring the Insured to be working for the plaintiff in the transaction, there does not 
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• 
• 
• 
appear to be any basis in the plain language of the Policy for the District Court' s 
interpretation. No matter how the facts are construed, Seegmiller's liability rests solely 
on his negligence as a real estate agent, he had no ownership interest in the Herriman 
property, acted on behalf of someone other than himself, and received a fee. Therefore, 
both the coverage provisions and the definition in question both require coverage under 
the express language of the Policy . 
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ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER UTAH LAW, THE TRANSFER OF MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
IS LEGAL AND ENFORCEABLE. 
In Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49, ~ 9, 980 P.2d 208, 
210 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court held that a legal malpractice claim may be 
• 
• 
transferred to a judgment creditor involuntarily, through legal process such as an • 
execution. 
In the present case, plaintiffs obtained a judgment for negligence against Mr. 
Seegmiller in the amount of $1,041,275.34 in Civil No. 070916209 on June 7, 2012. As 
a judgment creditor, plaintiffs were in a position to execute against all of Mr. 
Seegmiller' s assets, including his claims against defendants McDonald and Smith 
Hartvigsen for legal malpractice. Instead, Mr. Seegmiller voluntarily signed an 
agreement with the plaintiffs, voluntarily transferring said legal malpractice claims to the 
plaintiffs. 
In Snow, the Utah Supreme Court determined that there was "no need to decide 
whether a legal malpractice claim is assignable under Utah law." Id. at ~ 8. The issue 
remains a matter of first impression for the Utah Supreme Court. 
In Utah, there is a strong legislative and judicial intent to give the maximum effect 
to the principle of freedom of contract See e.g., Utah Code Ann., 48-2c-1901 
(Legislative intent -- Freedom of Contract.). In contrast, exculpatory clauses are 
generally disfavored, because they involve the attempt to avoid responsibility for 
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• 
• 
damages caused by one's own negligence. See B&B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134, 
136 (Colo. 1998) (emphasizing the principles of both freedom of contract and 
responsibility for negligence). "Courts throughout the United Stated have not hesitated to 
impose civil sanction upon attorneys who breach their fiduciary duties to their clients." 
Kilpatrick v. Willey Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah App. 1996). "The 
central purpose of the law of legal malpractice is to guard against and to remedy 
exploitation of the power lawyers possess over their client's lives and property." Id. at 
1289. 
It is inappropriate to prohibit a victim of legal malpractice from assigning his 
claim pursuant to the principle of contract, particularly on the basis that the guilty 
attorney would use such a ruling as a shield from responsibility for the damages he 
caused to his client. See e.g., Kilpatrick, supra. The Utah Supreme Court adopted 
similar logic in Snow to determine that public policy should prohibit lawyers from 
executing on judgment against their own clients to extinguish legal malpractice claims 
against them. Snow, supra, at~~ 12-18. Of particular importance to Mr. Seegmiller in 
the present case, since the involuntary execution would not extinguish the entire 
judgment against Mr. Seegmiller, refusing to allow a client with a judgment entered 
against him to make a voluntary transfer to the judgment creditor seems particularly 
likely to cause additional harm to the client. 
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Other courts have opined that the Utah Supreme Court would decide this question 
in favor of prohibiting the voluntary assignment of claims for legal malpractice. In the 
present case, the District Court relied upon the U.S. District Court's opinion in US. • 
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. US. Sports Specialty Ass'n, 2:07-CV-996-TS, 2012 WL 
6624202 at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 19, 2012), the ruling of Judge Davis of the Utah Fourth 
• District Court in Sleepy Holdings, LLC v. Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Case no. 120401523, and 
the public policy arguments in Goodley v Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 389, 397, 
133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). But those cases are not binding precedent, • 
nor do they contemplate the unique facts of the present case. In fact, the Utah Supreme 
Court may limit its ruling on this appeal to cases in which claims for legal malpractice are 
assigned to judgment creditors for claims arising from the underlying judgment, because 
the outcome of a voluntary or involuntary transfer on the public policy matterse are 
identical and it is against public policy to burden an injured client unjustifiably. 
The closest analysis of the merits applicable to this case is from the Maine case of 
• 
Thurston v. Continental Casualty Co., 567 A.2d 922 (Me. 1989), a state in which the • 
assignment of legal malpractice claims is permitted on a case-by-case basis. The court 
noted at the outset that in that case it was not facing "the establishment of a general 
market for [malpractice] claims, [since] the assignee has an intimate connection with the 
underlying lawsuit." Id. at 923.1 The court went on to state: 
1 The Court in Gregory v. Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180 (Or. App. 2000) also observed that the concerns 
against assignment oflegal malpractice claims are not present in many cases. Id. at 184. And 
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• The argument that legal services are personal and involve confidential attorney-
client relationships does not justify preventing a client like 3K from realizing the 
value of its malpractice claims in what may be the most efficient way possible, 
namely, its assignment to someone else with a clear interest in the claim who also 
has the time, energy and resources to bring suit. Id. 
The same principles weigh in favor of allowing assignment in the present case. 
Seegmiller is the holder of a malpractice claim. While he can bring the claim in his own 
name, it is considerably more efficient and just to allow the present lawsuit to proceed for 
several reasons. First, defendants failed to file the present motion at the outset of the 
case, when less had been invested in preparing the case for trial. The interests of judicial 
economy now favor assignment, as opposed to forcing Seegmiller to start over by refiling 
the malpractice claims in his own name. Second, the public policy justification that 
prohibiting assignment protects attorney-client confidentiality has also been rendered 
moot by defendants' failure to file the present motion at the outset of the case. Discovery 
into what was discussed between Seegmiller and his attorneys has now been fully 
completed and exposed. Seegmiller is the subject of a judgment in the amount of 
$1,041,275.34, which will not be dismissed if this Court prohibits the assignment of the 
claims against defendants. Seegmiller does not have the same time or resources as 
plaintiffs to bring suit in his own name, and it will be considerably more difficult for him 
to obtain redress for his damages caused by defendants if he is forced to refile the present 
other concerns are overstated, such as the notion that an attorney would temper his 
advocacy out of fear of the future assignment of a malpractice claim. Since the basis for 
a malpractice claim by the client would be the same, the risk of assignment does not seem 
to be something that would cause any actual additional concern. Id. at fn. 6. 
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lawsuit and start over in his own name. Moreover, the same exposure will occur in the 
context of that case. In short, there is no public policy justification to support 
• 
McDonald's arguments; while justice for Seegmiller demands that the case be permitted • 
to proceed. 
In dicta in Tanasse v. Snow, 929 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah App. 1996), the court 
observed whether other states allow legal malpractice claims to be freely assigned 
depends upon whether they view the claim as (1) unassignable by virtue of the fact that it 
• 
arises out of a contract for personal services, (2) unassignable as being akin to a personal • 
injury claim, or (3) freely assignable as arising out of negligence and breach of contract. 
There is strong Utah authority to support the conclusion that Utah falls into the third 
category. The Court of Appeals observed in Kilpatrick v. Willey Rein & Fielding, 909 
P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996) that "In Utah, the law of legal malpractice has grown up 
chiefly around actions based on negligence." Id. at 1290 (citations omitted.) The other 
two options make little sense, by comparison. With respect to the first, while a client 
cannot force an attorney to provide legal service to a third party by assigning a legal 
services contract because of the personal nature of the original contract, the client can 
very easily assign a malpractice claim to a third party because the burden is upon the 
third party to pursue the claim, not the attorney. 2 With respect to the second, the 
2 Even in the ruling of Judge Davis of the Utah Fourth District Court in Sleepy 
Holdings, LLC v. Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Case no. 120401523, Judge Davis observed 
"Utah law generally favors assignments of contract rights, unless the assignment would 
add to or materially alter the obligator's duty or risk." citing Clark v. Shelton, 584 P.2d 
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damages in legal malpractice cases are usually only economic damages. Gregory v. 
Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180, 182 (Or. App. 2000) (citing Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289 (Or. 
1987); Thurston v. Continental Casualty Co., 567 A.2d 922, 923 (Me. 1989). Personal 
injury claims, in contrast, involve "rights which are personal to the individual injured and 
are considered to be a concern only to the individual injured." Hedlund Manufacturing 
Co., Inc. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. 1987). In the present case, 
the claims assigned by Seegmiller are purely economic damages. Accordingly, the 
analysis of Utah courts favors assignability of Seegmiller's legal malpractice claims. 
Other public policy concerns did not prevent McDonald from committing legal 
malpractice, and they should not now be used as a shield to McDonald's responsibility 
for the damages he caused to Seegmiller or to otherwise make circumstances more 
difficult for Seegmiller. 
The rationale employed by other courts to deny the right of an injured client to 
voluntarily assign his legal malpractice claim has rested upon dubious public policy 
arguments which can be dispelled in the context of this case. One of those issues is 
whether there is a need to prohibit assignment to protect the sanctity of the attorney-client 
875, 877 (Utah 1978) and Cobabe v. Stranger, 844 P.2d 298,301 (Utah 1992). He noted 
that the exception would be where the obligations assigned involved the personal trust, 
confidence or skill of the obligor. Thus, if the facts of that case where the same as the 
present case, the correct conclusion would be that Seegmiller is entitled to assign his 
claims under Utah law. The assignment of the legal malpractice claims against 
defendants does not require any further personal trust, confidence or skill on the part of 
McDonald. In fact, the malpractice claim has grown out of McDonald's breach of the 
duties he owed to Seegmiller in that regard. 
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privilege. In the present case, depositions of the relevant attorney and client have already 
been taken, meaning that there is no attorney-client privilege available to be protected. 
This raises the question as to whether there should be an obligation on the part of an 
objecting attorney to bring a timely motion in order to avail such a public policy 
consideration. But in any case, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client. It 
cannot be used as a shield against malpractice claims by the offending attorney. 
Likewise, other public policy considerations are straw man arguments, with respect to 
which the refusal to permit a voluntary assignment does not actually change the outcome 
because of the right of the client to bring such claims in his own name if he cannot assign 
them. 
Arguments concernmg expectations that a client may have concernmg 
confidentiality, loyalty, and the lawyer's duties to provide the same are all important, but 
those expectations will not be affected by the assignability of legal malpractice claims. 
They will be impacted in the same way by any lawsuit for legal malpractice, whether 
brought by a client or a judgment creditor. 
Arguments concerning the reliability of testimony go to the weight of the evidence 
only. Considering the credibility of Mr. Seegmiller as a client who has assigned his claim 
is something that can easily and appropriately be handled by the trier of fact. This is true 
in the case of any assignment of claims and does not appear to be unique to attorneys in 
any respect. Therefore, such a policy consideration does not seem to be an appropriate 
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justification for shielding attorneys from assignment of claims against them for actual 
malpractice. 
In the present case, in particular, the proof of malpractice does not depend upon 
any testimony from Mr. Seegmiller. There is adequate documentation in the record to 
establish Mr. McDonald's malpractice. Mr. McDonald's own deposition testimony 
further confirms the details of his legal malpractice. Therefore, where none of the policy 
considerations raised in the District Court actually impact the ability of the parties to try 
the case, a blanket policy against voluntary assignment seems particularly overreaching 
m scope. 
II. SEEGMILLER HAS AGREED TO BRING THE MALPRACTICE 
CASE IN HIS OWN NAME, IF REQUIRED BY THE COURT. 
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement ( attached as Exhibit "C"), Seegmiller 
agreed to bring the case against McDonald in his own name if required to do so by the 
Court. [Settlement Agreement,~ 4.] In order to obtain relief from the judgment against 
him, Seegmiller will be required by the plaintiffs to do so. 
Utah recognizes claims for legal malpractice. Therefore, Seegmiller has the right 
to bring the present claim against McDonald in his own name. In addition to assigning 
those claims to plaintiffs, there are two other ways in which Seegmiller can accomplish 
that purpose. Either Seegmiller can appear as a named plaintiff in the present case, or 
Seegmiller can file a new lawsuit in his own name against defendants and start over. The 
claim against defendants is not going to go away, because the judgment against 
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Seegmiller has not gone away. Seegmiller has the right and the interest to pursue his 
claim for legal malpractice in order to mitigate the damages that he has suffered and 
continues to suffer as a result of defendants' legal malpractice. 
It is clearly in the interest of judicial economy for the current lawsuit to proceed. 
The parties have completed fact discovery. Dismissal of the claims at this juncture, just 
to force Seegmiller to refile the claims in his own name, would simply place additional 
expense on the parties and the courts. In fact, because the parties anticipate that Mr. 
Seegmiller will file and pursue the claims in his own name, consistent with the holding in • 
Snow, allowing the substitution of the parties best serves the client and the interests of 
judicial economy. 
It would clearly be unjust to Seegmiller to require him to hire new legal counsel to 
pursue his claims against defendants. Seegmiller has provided two days of deposition 
testimony and produced all of his documentation in support of the present case. Why 
should he have to spend additional money and time in order to obtain redress of his 
damages against these defendants? It seems particularly cruel to Seegmiller that • 
defendants would wait until the close of fact discovery to bring the present motion. 
Seegmiller would very much like to see his claims resolved by this Court, as he testified 
in his deposition, so that he will no longer have to face the large outstanding judgment 
against him. If defendants were going to force him to bring his claims in his own name, 
they should have filed their motion at the outset of the case. 
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Defendants argue that prohibiting assignment of legal malpractice claims protects 
the favorable impression that the public has of the legal system. However, in the present 
case, defendants' former client Seegmiller has lost all of his respect for the legal system 
as a direct result of the legal malpractice by defendants and the existence of a judgment 
against him in an amount in excess of $1 million dollars, for which he is now having 
difficulty obtaining insurance coverage as a direct result of defendants' legal malpractice. 
The only way to restore Seegmiller's confidence in the legal system3 is to show him that 
Utah is among those "courts throughout the United Stated [that] have not hesitated to 
impose civil sanction upon attorneys who breach their fiduciary duties to their clients." 
Kilpatrick v. Willey Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah App. 1996). "The 
central purpose of the law of legal malpractice is to guard against and to remedy 
exploitation of the power lawyers possess over their clients lives and property." Id. at 
1289. Thus, the interests of Mr. Seegmiller should be paramount, not those of the 
defendants who are responsible for his damages. It is malpractice and the impact that it 
has on clients which affects the image of the legal profession. Making those claims 
unassignable exacerbates the effects of legal malpractice, rather than protecting the image 
of the profession, particularly under the fact of this case involving assignment to a 
judgment creditor. 
3 Seegmiller testified in his deposition, "that the court systems are going to figure out 
the mess that was created, that's what I feel good about. And that I am not having to 
fund it, is what I feel great about." [Seegmiller Depo., p. 47:6 - 9.] 
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Rather than standing up for the interests of their clients in the present case, 
defendants are attempting once again to damage Mr. Seegmiller. Under Utah law, Mr. 
Seegmiller has a right to contract. Defendants want to take away his right to contract. 
Under Utah law, Mr. Seegmiller has a claim for legal malpractice to redress the damages 
he has suffered. Defendants want to make it more difficult for Mr. Seegmiller to obtain 
redress for his wrongs. Defendants argue that prohibiting the assignment of legal 
malpractice claims would protect the attorney-client privilege. However, rather than 
bringing the present motion at the outset of the litigation when the attorney-client 
privilege might have been protected, defendants waited until the end of discovery for 
tactical reasons, when there is no longer any attorney-client privilege left to protect. If 
the defendants wanted to shield the legal system, why didn't they do so at a point where it 
would have made a difference? It is clear that defendants' sole motive is to protect 
themselves against their own legal malpractice by attempting to manufacture a legal 
technicality, not to protect a former attorney-client relationship. By injuring Seegmiller 
• 
through his negligence, it is McDonald who has destroyed the attorney-client e 
relationship. McDonald must not be allowed to raise the attorney-client relationship now, 
as a shield to delay accountability for his own misconduct toward Seegmiller. 
Finally, the District Court relied upon the Arizona Court of Appeals case, Botma v. 
Huser, 30 P.3d 538, 543 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) for its holding that Mr. Seegmiller, as the 
assignor of the claim, should not be allowed to pursue the claim in his own name. As the 
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District Court stated, in Botma, the assignor had "nothing to retain" in the pending 
lawsuit. In contrast in the present case, Seegmiller has retained a financial interest in the 
recovery obtained, for reimbursement of approximately $70,000 of attorneys' fees 
incurred, and his release from the judgment entered against him is still contingent upon 
the complete performance of his obligations under the contract. [Settlement Agreement, 
~~ 5, 6.] Mr. Seegmiller continues to have a very strong vested interest in the Utah 
Supreme Court's ruling on these issues on appeal. Moreover, Mr. Seegmiller and the 
plaintiff are both entitled by law to get around any rule against voluntary assignment of 
legal malpractice claims by pursuing the involuntary assignment. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' JUDGMENT IS COVERED BY THE EXPRESS 
TERMS OF THE POLICY. 
Footnote 2 of the District Court's Final Order, identifies the insurance Policy 
issued by defendant Houston Casualty Company. The Final Order also confirms that 
Seegmiller was Prudential' s agent. The first section of the Policy defines the scope of 
coverage as follows: 
"I. COVERAGE. Coverage-Payment and Claims Made Provision. The 
Company shall pay on behalf of the Insured any Loss and Claim Expenses in 
excess of the Deductible amount and subject to the Limit of Liability as the 
Insured acting in a profession described in Item 3 of the Declarations shall 
become legally obligated to pay for Claim or Claims first made against the 
Insured during the Policy Period by reason of any Wrongful Act by an Insured 
provided always that the Insured has no knowledge of such Wrongful Act prior 
to the Inception Date of this Policy and further provided that such Wrongful 
Act took place subsequent to the Retroactive Date set forth in Item 8 of the 
Declarations." (emphasis added). 
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In addition, Section VIII(i) of the Policy expressly provides, "Any person or 
organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such judgment or written 
agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this Policy to the extent of the 
insurance afforded by this Policy." 
In the present case, plaintiff is the holder of such a judgment. 
The judgment issued by the Honorable Kate Toomey in Civil Case No. 070916209 
on June 7, 2012 is a money judgment for damages sustained by plaintiffs as a result of a 
finding of negligence by Robert Seegmiller in the perfonnance of his duties as a real 
estate agent, which he owed to plaintiffs in the course of the services he provided in 
exchange for a fee relative to the prospective purchase of real estate by plaintiffs from a 
third party. 
Seegmiller was an Insured under the policy. Section Il(b )(2) of the Policy 
expressly defines Insured as including any "employee of the Named Insured." The 
Named Insured was Utah County Real Estate, LLC DBA Prudential Utah Real Estate. 
Seegmiller was an employee of the Named Insured. 
The Policy provides in the first paragraph of Page 1 of 8, "THIS POLICY IS 
LIMITED TO LIABILITY FOR ONLY THOSE CLAIMS THAT ARE FIRST MADE 
AGAINST THE INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD." The Policy Period of 
the 2006 Policy was November 26, 2006 to November 26, 2007. The Policy Period of 
the 2007 Policy was November 26, 2007 to November 26, 2008. As described above, by 
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filing the Complaints on November 14, 2007, plaintiffs' claims were first made during 
the Policy Period of the 2006 Policy. By serving Seegmiller with the Summons and 
Complaints on December 1, 2007, plaintiffs' Claims were also made against Seegmiller 
during the Policy Period of the 2007 Policy. 
Section I of the Policy provides, "The Company shall pay on behalf of the Insured 
any Loss and Claim Expenses in excess of the Deductible amount and subject to the 
Limit of Liability as the Insured acting in the profession described in Item 3 of the 
Declarations shall become legally obligated to pay for Claim or Claims first made against 
the Insured during the Policy Period by reason of any Wrongful Act by an Insured .. . " 
The judgment issued by the Honorable Kate Toomey in Civil Case No. 070916209 on 
June 7, 2012 is a Loss resulting from the Wrongful Act of Seegmiller as in Insured acting 
in the profession described in the Declarations. 
Section II(d) of the Policy defines Loss as, "Loss shall mean a monetary judgment, 
award or settlement for damages including an award by a court of reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs to a party making a Claim ... " The judgment in question clearly matches 
the definition. 
Section II( e) of the Policy defines Wrongful Act as, "Wrongful Act shall mean any 
actual or alleged error or omission or breach of duty committed or alleged to have been 
committed or for failure to render such professional services as are customarily rendered 
in the profession of the Insured as stated in Item 3 of the Declarations." The basis for the 
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judgment is clearly described in the Memorandum Decision issued by the Honorable 
Kate Toomey in Civil Case No. 070916209 on October 18, 2011, as Seegmiller's 
negligence for breach of his duties as a real estate agent to disclose his agency and the fee 
he was being paid in the course of providing services to plaintiffs relative to the 
prospective purchase of real estate by plaintiffs from a third party. Again, the judgment 
rendered clearly matches the definition contained in the Policy. 
Item 3 of the Declarations is contained in Endorsement No. 1. It defines the 
Insured's profession as "Solely in the performance of services as a Real Estate 
Agent/Broker of non-owned property, for others for a fee." Again, the Memorandum 
Decision issued by the Honorable Kate Toomey in Civil Case No. 070916209 on October 
18, 2011, clearly describes Seegmiller's role as a real estate agent working for a fee 
relative to the prospective purchase of real estate by plaintiffs from a third party. Again, 
the judgment rendered clearly matches the definition contained in the Policy. 
Based on the express provisions of the Policy, plaintiffs have a direct right to 
payment of the Judgment in question by HCC. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT MISCONSTRUED THE POLICY. 
The interpretation of an insurance contract is an issue of law for the courts to 
decide. Richardson v. Hart, 2009 UT App 387, ~ 6, 223 P.3d 484. "As we would for 
contract language, we "interpret words in insurance policies according to their usually 
accepted meanings and in light of the insurance policy as a whole." Furthermore, 
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"[p ]olicy_ terms are harmonized with the policy as a whole, and all provisions should be 
given effect if possible."" Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Sorensen, 2013 UT App. 295, 1 
11 (quoting Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47, 1 5, 980 P.2d 685). "We 
construe the policy as we perceive it would be understood by the average, reasonable 
purchaser of insurance." Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (UT 
App. 1989) ( citations omitted). "More particularly, an insurer wishing to limit coverage 
through an exclusion must employ language clearly identifying the scope of the 
limitation." Id. (citations omitted). "Even if the policy employs technical terms, we do 
not construe it "through the magnifying eye of the technical lawyer," but rather as it 
would be understood by "one not trained in law or in the insurance business."" Id. 
( citations omitted). "There are certain basic principles that apply in any examination of 
exclusionary clauses in insurance contracts. Chief among these is that exclusionary 
clauses are to be most strictly construed against the insurer. The Policy should be 
interpreted in accordance with the way it would be understood by the average person 
purchasing insurance. It must not be forgotten that the purpose of insurance is to insure, 
and that construction should be taken which will render the contract operative, rather than 
inoperative. A construction which contradicts the general purpose of the contract or 
results in hardship or absurdity is presumed to be unintended by the parties." LDS Hosp. 
v. Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859, (UT 1988). " ... the language must be construed so as 
to give the insured the protection which he reasonably had a right to expect; and to that 
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end any doubts, ambiguities and uncertainties arising out of the language used in the 
policy must be resolved in his favor." Id. "Where exceptions, qualifications or 
exemptions are introduced into an insurance contract, a general presumption arises to the 
effect that that which is not clearly excluded by the operation of such contract is included 
in the operation thereof." Id. 
When interpreting an insurance contract, the Court must read the policy as a 
whole, and attempt to harmonize and give effect to all of its provisions. First Am. Title 
Ins. Co. v. JB. Ranch, 966 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 1998). If the policy language at issue is 
ambiguous, the Court must liberally construe the language in favor of the insured. S. W 
Energy Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 974 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1999). But if the 
language is not ambiguous, the Court must construe it according to its plain and ordinary 
meaning and no presumption in favor of coverage arises. Fort Lane Village, L.L.C. v. 
Travelers Indemnity Company of America, 805 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1239 (D. Utah 2011). 
A fundamental rule in construing a contract is to give effect of the intentions of the 
parties: LDS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). 
These intentions should be taken from an examination of the text of the contract itself and 
the contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its terms and provisions. Id. 
Utah courts have long followed the tenant that, "any ambiguity in the language of an 
insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. Since the insurance policy 
is drafted by the insurer, any ambiguities are construed against it. Id. The Utah Supreme 
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Court has stated the test to be applied in determining the ambiguity of an insurance policy 
as follows: 
Would the meaning of the language of the insurance contract be plain to a person 
of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and 
reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in 
the light of existing circumstances, including the purposes of the policy? 
Id. at 858 - 59. 
Applying the above-referenced cases to the facts of the present case, as a matter of 
law the Policy must be interpreted in a way that provides the most broad potential 
coverage to Prudential and Seegmiller that the Policy will allow for by its interpretation. 
Since the definition of the Named Insured Profession can be interpreted as employing the 
word "solely" from the definition contained in Endorsement No. 1 to the Policy to 
distinguish the profession of real estate from other professions, such as the practice of 
law or the sale of insurance, the Policy cannot be interpreted as a matter of law to limit 
the coverage available to Prudential and Seegmiller beyond the scope of what Utah real 
estate agents and brokers might commonly do in the performance of their profession. In 
the present case, that means that the claims against Prudential for negligent supervision of 
Bobby Seegmiller all fall within the regular activities of a real estate broker in the State 
of Utah and are covered by the coverage provisions of the Policy. It also means that the 
activities of Bobby Seegmiller, whereby he introduced plaintiffs to various parcels of real 
estate which they might purchase from third parties, the drafting of a real estate purchase 
contract on behalf of the plaintiffs, the submission of that real estate purchase contract to 
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the seller, and the other ordinary activities of a real estate agent performed by Seegmiller 
on behalf of plaintiffs all fall within the definition of his profession contained in the 
insurance policy. Such activities all fall within the scope of Seegmiller's employment, 
because they were intended to secure listing agreements for the properties being 
purchased by plaintiffs on behalf of Prudential. It would be unreasonable, as a matter of 
law, to think that a real estate broker would purchase an insurance policy to cover himself 
and his agents, where the policy might be construed to not cover any of those ordinary 
activities, simply because one of his agents was concurrently doing something unrelated 
to the covered activity for which the insurance policy was purchased. See TM v. 
Executive Risk Indemnity Inc., 2002 WY 179, ,i 9-15, 59 P.3d 721 (Wyo. 2002) ("solely" 
should be construed against the insurer in favor of coverage); College v. Nat'l Union Fire 
Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 742, 750-51 (5th Cir. 1999) ("solely" must be construed in favor of the 
insured regardless of which interpretation is more reasonable"). 
It is also interesting to note how badly defendant HCC misconstrued both the facts 
and the provisions of the insurance policy. For example, the definition of the Named 
Insured's Profession in Endorsement No. 1 actually states, "solely in performance of 
services as a real estate agent/broker of non-owned properties, for others for a fee." 
Defendants HCC asserted that Seegmiller was not paid a fee by the plaintiffs. However, 
the definition of the Named Insured's Profession does not require the plaintiff to be the 
one paying the fee to Seegmiller, nor does it require that Seegmiller actually receive a 
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fee. It should be very simple to understand why with respect to a description of the real 
estate profession an insurer could not limit coverage for an insurance agent merely to 
situations in which the insurance agent actually received payment of a fee from a 
plaintiff. In the real estate industry, it is common for seller of a property to sign a listing 
agreement to pay a fee to both the seller's real estate agent and the buyer's real estate 
agent, which fee is paid at the time the transaction closes. If the Policy was interpreted in 
the manner argued by defendant HCC, then there would be no insurance coverage any 
time Seegmiller acted as a real estate agent for a buyer in a transaction, because the fee 
would always be paid by the seller of the property rather than the client. Likewise, the 
policy would not provide any coverage anytime the transaction in question failed to close, 
even if the client alleged that it was somehow through Seegmiller's negligence that the 
transaction was scuttled. The definition in Endorsement No. 1 merely describes an 
industry in which real estate agents provide services to others in exchange for a fee, 
whether or not every single transaction is consummated.4 
Defendant argued that Seegmiller did not receive a fee, even though the 
Memorandum Decision and Order issued in 070916209 actually describes the fee paid to 
4 In the present case, Seegmiller was actually paid a fee in exchange for the services he 
rendered in putting together the transaction at issue in Civil No. 070916209, the case in 
which a judgment has been entered against Seegmiller. That fee was paid by the seller of 
the property at the time the seller funded the transaction using the money deposited by 
plaintiffs into the title company's escrow account. Seegmiller had no ownership interest 
in the property being sold by the seller to the plaintiffs. Consequently, every single 
element of the description of the Named Insured's Profession in Endorsement No. l. is 
satisfied with regard to the judgment which is the subject of the lawsuit against HCC in 
this case. 
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Seegmiller, which then becomes the basis for the judgment against him as a result of his 
failure to disclose the fee to the plaintiffs. The Memorandum and Decision and Order 
references the fee on pages 3, 6 and 8. Defendant cited Am. Nat'! Prop. & Cas. Co. v. 
Sorensen, 2013 UT App. 295, ~ 11 for the proposition that the word "fee" must be given 
its plain and ordinary meaning. However, Am. Nat'!. did not actually deal with the 
meaning of the word "fee." Defendant failed to cite any legal authority that would 
indicate that the compensation paid by Valley View Estates to Seegmiller in exchange for 
his services in the Herriman Transaction would not qualify as a "fee" within the meaning 
expressed in Endorsement 1. In fact, ,i 16 of Seegmiller's employment agreement with 
Prudential clearly indicates that any "compensation of any kind" is within the scope of 
Seegmiller's employment by Prudential as a real estate agent. (See footnote 5, below.) 
Consistent with common practice in the Named Insured's Profession, as described 
above, Seegmiller and Prudential actually obtained listing agreements with respect to all 
the property being purchased by plaintiffs. By procuring listing agreements with regard 
to the property being purchased by the plaintiffs, the listing agreements validate the fact 
that both Seegmiller and Prudential were engaged in the ordinary business activity of 
their profession as described by the Policy in Endorsement No. 1. 
There is nothing in the coverage provision of the Policy that uses the word 
"solely." Instead, HCC is liable to pay on behalf of an Insured the full amount for which 
the Insured becomes legally obligated as a result of any Wrongful Act. Wrongful Act is 
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defined in section IL( e) of the Policy as, "Wrongful Act shall mean any actual or a1leged 
error or omission or breach of duty committed or alleged to have been committed or for 
failure to render such professional services as are customarily rendered in the profession 
of the Insured as stated in Item 3 of the Declarations." Again, the Policy expressly covers 
any actual or alleged error or omission or breach of duty by the Insured without using the 
word "solely." 
The District Court erred in two respects. First, the District Court erred in 
concluding that the "conflict of interest" referred to in the judgment meant that 
Seegmiller was playing a dual role in the transaction. The "conflict of interest" referred 
to the undisclosed fee that Seegmiller was receiving in his role as a real estate agent 
bringing plaintiffs to the transaction as purchasers, which is within the definition of the 
insured profession. Second, the application of the word "solely" from the definition of 
the insured profession to further limit the coverage provisions of the Policy beyond the 
express language of that provision is incorrect as a matter of law. The District Court 
incorrectly limited the coverage provisions of the Policy by taking the language of 
Endorsement No. 1 of the Policy and interpreting the Policy as though the word "solely" 
appeared in the coverage provisions of the Policy. The main problem with the District 
Court's interpretation is that Endorsement No. 1 is merely a definition of the Named 
Insured's Profession. The word "solely" does not even appear as a complete sentence in 
Endorsement No. 1. It is merely a definition used to identify the real estate business in 
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which Prudential and Seegmiller were gainfully employed. The meaning of the word 
"solely" in the definition does nothing more than specify that the Named Insured's 
Profession is that of working as a real estate agent or broker, as opposed to an attorney or 
an insurance salesman. Because the coverage provision requires coverage for any 
negligence committed by Seemiller when acting within the real estate profession, the 
Judgment for Seegmiller' s negligent breach of his duties as a real estate agent is covered 
by the Policy without regard to any conflict of interest that Seegmiller may have had 
while acting as a real estate agent. Thus, according to the express terms of the coverage 
provisions of the Policy, HCC is liable to provide coverage to an Insured anytime the 
Insured is doing something related to their profession as a real estate agent or broker. 
The cases cited by defendant are inapplicable to the present case. Van Ness & 
Sperry, Inc. v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, PA, 979 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1992) 
involved a dispute between an employer and two former employees who allegedly 
violated the terms of a written promise not to complete. Consequently, the dispute was 
• 
• 
unrelated to providing the type of professional services insured by the policy. Young v. • 
Illinois Union Ins. Co., 366 Fed. Appx. 777 (9th Cir. 2010) involved a director and 
officer's policy that only covered employees and excluded legal services. Dish Network 
Corp. v. Arch Specialty. Ins. Co., 989 F Supp. 2nd 1137(D. Colo. 2013) involved a claim 
that a competitor was infringing upon the use of technology, which had nothing to do 
with the insurance policy, which covered claims relating to advertising. 
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A. Seegmiller Acted on Behalf of Prudential, Because He Obtained Listing 
Agreements on Behalf of Prudential as a Direct Result of the Services He 
Provided as a Real Estate Agent Licensed By Prudential. 
The undisputed facts show that Seegmiller was · acting on behalf of Prudential. 
Bruce Tucker testified in the present case that Bobby Seegmiller was doing work for 
Prudential to obtain listing agreements for the sale of real property on behalf of 
Prudential with respect to both the Highland and Herriman Transactions. Bruce Tucker 
testified . that in 2006, Seegmiller informed Prudential that Seegmiller was working with 
plaintiffs as individuals interested in purchasing real estate with regard to two real estate 
developments, and that Seegmiller had been told by plaintiffs that he and Prudential 
would be given the listing for the sale of the lots plaintiffs intended to purchase. [R. 
6032-61, Exhibit 2, Tucker Deposition pp. 53: 15 - 22.] Bruce Tucker also testified that it 
was a common practice of Seegmiller to generate listing agreements for Prudential by 
developing relationships with developers of real estate. [R. 6032-61, Exhibit 2, Tucker 
Depo., pp. 55:17 - 57:5.] On behalf of Prudential, Seegmiller signed listing agreements 
for the sale of the lots being purchased by plaintiffs. Pursuant to the terms of the listing 
agreements, Prudential was entitled to a commission on each lot sold by Seegmiller. [R. 
5025-73, Exhibit 3, Herriman Listing Agreement.] Prudential agreed that because 
Seegmiller was generating listings for Prudential with respect to the Highland and 
Herriman transactions, that Prudential would waive its normal share of the compensation 
being received from third parties in the transactions. [R. 6032-61, Tucker Depo, pp. 
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53:15 - 54:15.] As a matter of law, Seegmiller could not have engaged in providing the 
services in question during the course of the Herriman transaction without a real estate 
license. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2(±)-201(2) requires: 
. .. an individual is required to be licensed as a principal broker, associate broker, 
or a sales agent if the individual performs, offers to perform, or attempts to 
perfonn one act for valuable consideration of: (a) buying, selling, leasing, 
managing, or exchanging real estate for another person; or (b) offering for another 
person to buy, sell, lease, manage, or exchange real estate." 
Seegmiller had a written agreement with Prudential that established an exclusive 
relationship with Prudential for all compensation Seegmiller earned in any real estate 
related business.5 The law required Seegmiller to affiliate his license with a principal 
broker. Utah Code Ann., § 61-2f-302(1). Moreover, Prudential had a legal duty to 
supervise Seegmiller as a real estate agent. Utah Administrative Code, Rule 162-2f-
401(c)(l)(f) requires a broker to, "exercise active supervision over the conduct of all 
licensees and unlicensed staff employed by or affiliated with the principal broker ... " 
Wardley Better Homes v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009, 1017, 2002 UT 99 at ,i 27 
provides the Utah Supreme Court's three-part test for determining when a real estate 
5 Paragraph 16 of Seegmiller' s Employment Contract (Memorandum in Support, Exhibit E, Tab 21) 
expressly provides, 
"Exclusive Relationship with Broker. Salesperson shall not enter into any agreement 
with another licensed real estate Broker, individual or organization for any fees or 
compensation of any kind pertaining to the real estate business without the consent of 
Broker. Compliance with state laws, rules and regulations require that commissions, 
finder fees, bonuses or referral fees be paid to the Broker rather than to Salesperson 
directly. Salesperson may not enter into an agreement with a client for payment of 
compensation of any kind in lieu of the customary commission without the written 
consent of Broker." ·· 
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agent is acting within the scope of his employment. First, the agent's conduct is of the 
general kind the employee is employed to perform. Id. 
In the present case, the undisputed facts are that Seegmiller was showing property 
owned by third parties to the plaintiffs for prospective purchase; that Seegmiller was 
providing comparable sales data to plaintiffs; that Seegmiller drafted a real estate 
purchase contract for plaintiffs, which included his name as the agent of plaintiffs in the 
contract; that Seegmiller was otherwise facilitating the purchase of the Herriman property 
from a third party; and that Seegmiller obtained a listing agreement to resell that same 
property on behalf of the plaintiffs; all of which conduct is the normal and general kind of 
things that a real estate agent does in the course of his employment. As the testimony of 
Bruce Tucker indicates, Seegmiller discussed all of those things with his employer in 
order to negotiate a split of the commission he was being paid in the transactions that was 
different from the split provided for in Mr. Seegmiller's employment contract. 
Consequently, there can be no question that the first prong of the Utah Supreme Court' s 
test is satisfied by the evidence. 
Second, the agent's conduct occurs within the hours and spatial boundaries 
common to the agent' s employment. Id. 
There is no dispute that the common practice of a real estate agent's employment 
is to generally show people properties during normal business hours, to communicate 
with them by email, and to hold meetings either at the property or at any other convenient 
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location where the agent can help facilitate the transaction. There is absolutely nothing 
unusual about the time and place where Mr. Seegmiller interacted with the plaintiffs as a 
real estate agent. Consequently, again, there can be no dispute that the second element of e 
the Utah Supreme Court's test is satisfied by the undisputed facts. 
Third, the agent's conduct is motivated at least in part by the purpose of serving 
the employer's interests. Id. 
In the present case, Mr. Seegmiller was required by law to have a license in order 
to even engage in the conduct in question. Mr. Seegmiller had an exclusive contract with 
Prudential which prohibited him from engaging in any real estate activity outside of the 
direct supervision of Prudential. Consequently, Mr. Seegmiller approached Bruce Tucker 
to discuss these transactions with him. The conversation between Seegmiller and 
Prudential focused on the benefit to Prudential that would result from the listings that 
Seegmiller would obtain by providing services to the plaintiffs. Prudential consented to 
Seegmiller's participation in the Highland and Herriman Transactions for the expressed 
purpose of obtaining those listing agreements. In fact, because of his involvement, 
Seegmiller did successfully obtain those listings, which provided a direct benefit to 
Prudential. Consequently, again, there can be absolutely no dispute that the third prong 
of the Utah Supreme Court's test has been satisfied by the undisputed facts. 
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B. Seegmiller Acted Within the Scope of the Insured Profession. 
Item 3 of the Declarations defines the Insured's profession as "Solely in the 
performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned property, for others 
for a fee." The Memorandum Decision issued by the Honorable Kate Toomey in Civil 
Case No. 070916209 on October 18, 2011, clearly describes Seegmiller' s role as a real 
estate agent working for a fee relative to the prospective purchase of real estate by 
plaintiffs from a third party. Seegmiller had no ownership in the Herriman Property, and 
he received a fee from the seller for his services. The Judgment rendered clearly 
matches the definition of the Insured profession. 
HCC argued that the definition of the Insured's profession should be interpreted in 
a way that is different from the language contained in the Policy. The Policy uses the 
phrase "for a fee," The payment of $165,000 to Seegmiller for his services with regard to 
the transaction was a "fee." In footnote 18 of the judgment against Seegmiller, the court 
found that the fee was paid by the seller in the transaction. The same applies to the phra~e 
contained in the Policy "as a real estate agent." It is clear that Mr. Seegmiller was acting 
as a real estate agent. It's also clear that the Judgment entered against Seegmiller is for 
the violation of specific duties he owed as a real estate agent. The Judgment wasn't 
entered on the basis that Seegmiller was acting as the plaintiff's real estate agent, but that 
because Seegmiller was a real estate agent he owed specific duties to plaintiffs whether 
he was their real estate agent or not. Since the Policy only define the Insured's 
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profession with the phrase "as a real estate agent" without requiring the Insured to be 
working for the plaintiff in the transaction, there does not appear to be any basis in the 
plain language of the Policy for the interpretation made by the District Court. No matter 
how the facts are construed, Seegmiller was acting as a real estate agent, had no 
ownership interest in the Herriman property, acted on behalf of someone other than 
himself, and received a fee. 
The Policy charged defendant HCC with two duties toward the Insureds, a duty to 
defend the Insureds and a duty to indemnify the Insureds for financial liability they may 
incur as a result of a claim. When determining an insurer's duty-to-defend, Utah courts 
focus on the insurance policy and the complaint. "An insurer's duty-to-defend is 
determined by comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of the 
complaint." Fire Ins. Exch. v. Estate of Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, ,i 21, 27 P.3d 555. An 
alternative formulation of this rule is whether the complaint alleges a risk within the 
coverage of the policy. Id. at ,i 21 n.3. The duty to indemnify is also governed by the 
terms of the Policy. Benjamin v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1216 
(Utah 2006) (citing Fire Ins. Exch. v. Estate of Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, ,i 14, 27 P.3d 
555). 
"[U]nder Utah law, "an Insurer 'has a duty to defend the Insured against a liability 
claim which is covered or which is potentially covered.' " Summerhays Co. L. C. v. Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., 2014 UT 28, ,i 36, 332 P.3d 908 (quoting Mesmer v. MD. Auto Ins. 
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Fund, 725 A. 2d 1053, 1061 (MD. 1999))." (emphasis added) "[G]enerally, an insurer's 
duty to defend arises out of a potentially covered claim and last until the conclusion of 
the underlying lawsuit, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for coverage." 
(citing 14 Couch on Insurance§ 200:47 (3d ed. 2014)). 
In the present case, the Policy and its terms are appropriately before the Court. 
Defendant HCC breached the contract by failing to both pay the cost of defense and 
failing to indemnify Seegmiller with respect to the judgment rendered against him. 
Seegmiller was damaged as a result, inasmuch as he has paid McDonald and other 
attorneys in providing his own defense following the date upon which HCC denied 
coverage relative to the Claims in question. Seegmiller has been further damaged in the 
amount of the judgment that remains outstanding and unsatisfied against him, including 
the interest that is continuing to accrue with respect to such judgment. Seegmiller has 
assigned his claims against defendant HCC to plaintiffs. Under the Policy, plaintiffs also 
have a direct claim under Section VIII(i) as judgment creditors. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Utah Supreme Court: 
a. Direct the District Court that legal malpractice claims are assignable as a 
matter of law under the facts of the case; 
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b. Alternatively, to direct the District Court to permit Mr. Seegmiller to be 
substituted as the plaintiff in the action to allow him to continue pursuit of the legal 
malpractice action in his own name; 
c. Correct the District Court's interpretation of the Policy and direct the District 
Court that the insurance Policy issued by Houston Casualty Company does provide 
coverage to Robert Seegmiller with respect to the judgment for negligence issued against 
Robert Seegmiller in Civil No. 070916209 on June 7, 2012; and 
d. Direct the District Court that as judgment creditors, plaintiffs are entitled to 
coverage pursuant to Section VIII(i) of the insurance Policy issued by Houston Casualty 
Company with respect to the direct action brought against Houston Casualty Company 
with respect to the judgment for negligence entered against Robert Seegmiller in Civil 
No. 070916209 on June 7, 2012. 
ADDENDUM 
Per the Table of Contents, Addendum are attached following the signature of the 
Appellant and the Certificate of Service by mail. 
DATED this 29th day of March, 2016. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM CO:MPTON, and JOHN 
SIMCOX, individuals, and SALTA.IR 
INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL J. McDONALD, an individual, 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company, 
HOUSTON CASUAL TY COMP ANY, a 
Texas licensed insurance company and 
JOHN DOES 2-10, 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART 
AND DISMISSING CASE IN ITS 
ENTIRETY WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 130906137 
Judge Paul Maughan 
Pending before the Court are the following motions: 
I. Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment re: Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims. 
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2. Houston Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment_ 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Houston 
Casualty Company. 
4. Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for Summary 
Judgment re: Damages and Causation. 
5. Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Amended Motion for 
Summary Judgment re: Breach. 
The Court held a hearing on these motions on August 13, 2015. Thor Roundy appeared 
on behalf of Plaintiffs. Keith A . Call and Robert W. Lin appeared on behalf of Daniel J. 
McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC (collectively, the "Lawyer Defendants"). Karl A. 
Bekeny and Rebecca Hill appeared on behalf of Houston Casualty Company. 
After careful consideration of the briefing submitted and the arguments of the parties 
presented on August 13, 2015, the Court RULES and ORDERS as follows: 
1. Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for Summary 
Judgment re: Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims is hereby GRANTED in its entirety. All 
claims against Defendants Daniel J. McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC are DISMISSED 
with prejudice. 
In this case, the Plaintiffs, William Compton, John Simcox and Saltair Investments, LLC, 
have sued the Lawyer Defendants for legal malpractice. It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs never 
had an attorney-client relationship with the Lawyer Defendants. Rather, they have taken their 
claims for legal malpractice by assignment from the Lawyer Defendants' former client, Bobby 
Seegmiller. The Lawyer Defendants' motion seeks an order that legal malpractice claims are not 
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assignable as a matter of law, at least under the facts of this case. 
In US. Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. US. Sports Specialty Ass'n, 2:07-CV-996-TS, 2012 
WL 6624202, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 19, 2012), the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah determined that the Utah Supreme Court would likely adopt the majority rule that legal 
malpractice claims may not be assigned. In Sleepy Holdings, LLC v. Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Case 
No. 120401523, (Fourth District Court, State of Utah), the trial court entered a Ruling on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, Motion to Consolidate, and on Defendant Snell & Willmer [sic] 
L.L.P. and Wade Budge's Motion to Dismiss on July 15, 2013. In that ruling, the Court found 
that legal malpractice claims are not voluntarily assignable. In consideration of those cases and 
the public policy considerations as outlined in Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 
389, 397, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. app. 1976), as well the policy considerations outlined in 
the various other jurisdictions that prohibit the voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims, 
this Court adopts the majority rule in this case and finds that legal malpractice claims are not 
voluntarily assignable, at least under the circumstances of this case. 
Specifically, the Court is persuaded that this case represents exactly why a majority of 
jurisdictions in the United States have prohibited voluntary assignment of legal malpractice 
claims. For example, allowing voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims would 
compromise a client's expectation of confidentiality and loyalty, along with the lawyer's duty to 
provide the same. The Court finds that these policies have been violated here. For example, Mr. 
Seegmiller, the "client" in the underlying case and the "assignor" of the legal malpractice claims, 
has shared with Plaintiffs in this case attorney-client communications not only between himself 
and the Lawyer Defendants, but also between his former co-client (Prudential Real Estate) and 
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the Lawyer Defendants. Thus, the attorney-client privilege between Prudential Real Estate and 
the Lawyer Defendants was violated. In addition, allowing voluntary assignment of legal 
malpractice claims would increase the risk that a client who was satisfied with his legal 
representation would be exploited or coerced to invent and assign a legal malpractice claim in 
order to get out from under a judgment entered against him. In this case, it appears that Mr. 
Seegmiller had no intention of bringing a legal malpractice claim, but may have been unduly 
influenced to assign and "cooperate" with Plaintiffs' pursuit of a malpractice claim to get out 
from under a judgment that the Plaintiffs had obtained against him. Even if confidential 
information was not shared with Plaintiffs, and even if the former client was not exploited or 
unduly influenced, the circumstances of this case show that t:4e risk of such is real and that legal 
malpractice claims should therefore not be voluntarily assignable. 
The Court further finds that to allow voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims, 
especially in view of the facts here, would pry apart, or risk prying apart, the attorney-client 
relationship, would adversely reflect on the judicial process, and should not be encouraged. 
At the August 13, 2015 hearing, Plaintiffs argued that the Court could allow them to 
substitute Mr. Seegmiller as Plaintiff in this case, thereby resolving any concern with respect to 
Mr. Seegmiller's voluntary transfer of his legal malpractice claims. In Botma v. Huser, 39 P.3d 
538, 543 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals of Arizona invalidated an assignment of 
legal malpractice claims. Just as here, the plaintiff in Botma argued that the assignor of the legal 
malpractice claim should be able to continue to pursue the claim. The Court held that the 
assignor had "nothing to 'retain' in the present lawsuit, a lawsuit that can benefit only [assignee]. 
Toe purpose of the assignment agreement was only to allow [assignee] to recover any and all 
4 of 10 
monies which might be owing to [assignor] and that [assignee] will be the ultimate beneficiary of 
[assignor's] claims. To allow the present lawsuit, which was born out of that assignment 
agreement, to proceed in [assignor's] name would be to wink at the rule against assignment of 
legal malpractice claims." Id at 543. 
The Court finds this reasoning persuasive. Here, just as in Botma, there is no dispute that 
Plaintiff is the ultimate beneficiary of the alleged malpractice claims. To allow this lawsuit, 
which was born out of an invalid assignment, to proceed in Mr. Seegmiller's name, would be to 
wink at the rule against assignment of legal malpractice claims. 
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith 
Hartvigsen's Motion for Summary Judgment re: Assignment of Legal Malpractice. The Court 
DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Daniel J. McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen from the suit. 
2. Defendant Houston Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
hereby GRANTED in its entirety. All claims against Defendant Houston Casualty Company are 
DISMISSED with prejudice. 
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege they are entitled, as both judgment 
creditors and Robert Seegmiller's assignees, to recover $1,041,275.34 from Houston Casualty 
Company as a result of Houston Casualty Company's decision to deny coverage for Robert 
Seegmiller with respect to two underlying lawsuits in which Plaintiffs sued Robert Seegmiller, 
among others.1 On October 18, 2011, the Court in the Herriman Lawsuit granted summary 
judgment in Plaintiffs' favor and against Robert Seegmiller; Plaintiffs subsequently obtained a 
judgment in the Herriman Lawsuit against Robert Seegmiller for $1,041,275.34 on June 7, 2012. 
1 Toe two underlying lawsuits are: Simcox, et al. v. Seegmiller, et al., Case No. 070916208, filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County (the "Highland Lawsuit'') and Compton, et al. v. Seegmiller, et al., Case 
No. 070916209, filed in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County (the "Herriman Lawsuit''). 
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Plaintiffs allege Houston Casualty Company is liable under one or more insurance 
policies Houston Casualty Company issued to Utah County Real Estate, LLC ("Prudential") 
from November 26, 2006 through November 26, 2009.2 During that time, Robert Seegmiller 
was a Prudential real estate agent. 
Pursuant to the HCC Policies' Insuring Agreement and Endorsements 1 and 5 of the HCC 
Policies, Houston Casualty Company agreed to provide insurance coverage to Prudential, and its 
real estate agents while providing Professional Services "on behalf of' Prudential, "[ s ]olely in 
the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others 
for a fee." In her October 18, 2011 Memorandum and Decision in the Herriman Lawsuit, the 
Honorable Kate Toomey ruled that "regardless of whether Mr. Seegmiller was acting as the real 
estate agent for Plaintiffs for the purpose of purchasing the Herriman lots, he owed certain duties 
to the Plaintiff [sic], which he breached by failing to clarify his role in the transaction, and failing 
to disclose a personal interest in the transaction." Because Robert Seegmiller had a personal 
interest, he held dual or competing roles in the transaction giving rise to the Herriman Lawsuit 
Robert Seegmiller cannot have held dual or competing roles in the transaction and 
simultaneously have acted "solely" as Plaintiffs' real estate agent "on behalf of' Prudential. As 
such, there is no coverage for Robert Seegmiller for the Herriman Lawsuit under the HCC 
Policies as a matter of law. 
Further, at the hearing Plaintiffs argued that pursuant to Section VIlI(i) of the HCC 
2 From November 26, 2006 to November 26, 2009, Houston Casualty Company provided Professional Liability 
Errors and Omissions Insurance to Prudential and its real estate agents under three successive policies that contained 
the same material terms. Policy H706-l 7424 covered the Policy Period of November 26, 2006 to November 26, 
2007; Policy No. H707-16855 covered the Policy Period of November 26, 2007 to November 26, 2008; and Policy 
No. H708-162&8 covered the Policy Period of November 26, 200& to November 26, 2009 (the policies are, 
collectively, the "HCC Policies"). 
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Policies, Plaintiffs, as judgment creditors, have a direct right of action against Houston Casualty 
Company regardless _of whether Robert Seegmiller was covered by the HCC Policies.. Section 
VIII(i) of the HCC Policies states that "[ a]ny person or organization or the legal representative 
thereof who has secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to 
recover under this Policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this Policy." The Court finds 
that pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of Section VIlI(i), Plaintiffs cannot obtain 
greater coverage than the HCC Policies provide for Robert Seegmiller. The Court has ruled that 
the HCC Policies do not provide coverage for Robert Seegmiller. Therefore Plaintiffs, whether 
as judgment creditors or assignees, are similarly not entitled to coverage under the HCC Policies. 
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Houston Casualty Company' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Houston Casualty Company 
from the suit. 
3. For the reasons discussed in Section 2, above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Cross 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Houston Casualty Company. 
4. For the reasons discussed in Section 2, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and 
DENIES-IN-PART Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for 
Summary Judgment re: Damages and Causation. The Court grants the motion as to the 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint that implicate insurance coverage with respect to 
claims made against Bobby Seegmiller. To the extent there are allegations that do not implicate 
insurance coverage with respect to claims made against Bobby Seegmiller, the Court denies the 
motion as to those allegations. 
5. The Court DENIES Defendants Daniel J. McDonald' s and Smith Hartvigsen's 
September 10, 2015 01 :22 PM 
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• 
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment re: Breach. 
In light of the Court's rulings contained in this Order, all claims against all Defendants 
are being dismissed with prejudice. This Order addresses all claims asserted against all 
Defendants, and dismisses this case in its entirety, with prejudice. This constitutes the final order 
of the Court. 
----END OF ORDER------
*** Entered by the Court on the date indicated by the Court's Seal at the top of the first page*** 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . 
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of September, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN PART AND DISMISSING CASE IN ITS ENTIRETY WITH PREJUDICE, to be 
electronically filed via the Court's GreenFiling system which will send notification to the 
following: 
Cory B. Mattson, Attorney 
Thor Roundy, Attorney 
801 North 500 West, Suite 150 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Rebecca Hill, Attorney 
Christensen & Jensen 
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Houston Casualty Company 
Karl A. Bekeny, Attorney, admitted pro hac vice 
Kevin M. Young, Attorney, admitted pro hac vice 
Tucker Ellis LLP 
950 Main Avenue, Suite ll00 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-7213 
Attorneys for Houston Casualty Company 
Isl Cynthia L. Warne 
Legal Assistant 
3376630vl 
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9. Assignment. This appeal is subject to transfer by the Supreme Court to the Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(4). Plaintiffs oppose such a 
transfer and have addressed a letter to the Utah Supreme Court concerning the 
appropriateness of retaining the case on the docket of the Supreme Court. 
10. Related Appeals. Defendants have filed a cross appeal, dated October 14, 2015. 
11. Attachments. 
The following are attached: 
a. The final judgment from which the appeal is taken. 
The following are not attached because they are not applicable in this appeal. 
b. The notice of appeal and any order extending the time for the filing of a notice of 
appeal. 
c. Any rulings and/or findings of the trial court or administrative tribunal included 
in the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. 
d. Any application for rehearing filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15. 
e . Any motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure or Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6, and any orders disposing of such motions. 
f. If the appellant is an inmate confined in an institution invoking rule 4(b ), the 
notarized statement or written declaration required by Rule 4(g), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 2015. 
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Cory B Mattson 
Thor B. Roundy 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DOCKETING 
STATEMENT was served via U.S. Mail to all parties listed below on this 26th day of 
October, 2015: 
Keith Call 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, STE 1100 
PO Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5000 
Rebecca Hill 
Christensen and Jensen 
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Compton16-Docketing Statement 6 
Karl A Bekeny 
Paul L. Janowicz 
Tucker Ellis, LLP 
950 South Main, Ste. 1100 
Cleveland, OH 44113 
Isl Cory B Mattson 
• 
• 
ii 
ADDENDUM ''B'' 
CE'.R.TIFICA TION 
The .undersigned· hereby certifies that the attached Declarations, Endorsements, 
Application and Polii;y l1omi (Professional Liability. Errors & Omissions Insurance) combined 
form a_ true, conipl¢te .ah.cl ~te 4Qpy .·qf H.i}u.ston. C:asual!:y Company folicy No. H706-l 7424 
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same. 
Jill E. T9~R.E~.. . . 
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No. 02T06l345)2 
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\' : PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
,-.~_ERRORS ·&= O.MISS.10.NS:· IN.SU.RANCE 
(This>insuran~Js.: Oll_A Glahn~ Mad~ Basis) 
THI~ P(){.ICY IS LIMITED to UABIU:i'Y.fOR QNtY nt0$~~!,A™.S11;AT ME::A('IGT:MADE AGAINST THE 
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·forth Jn Jtem 7 ot: th1f D~!J~.6r ~ eiii:!/er:tem,Jlfia~n da~i !f ,aIJf. . 
b} IJ$llred 
-instlrea:' ~r ~in$.l~~~_i f!'l9air 
1} The NaffilM! 111!\t.ired ai deslgnat~ill:H.em} o(UJe.l)ecla(atklns; · 
2) Any partner, axec:u!Mi cifflc:er,°dlrecfur-r:ir er.riploya·e ·o11ha Named lnsiJied while acting .wilhir(the scope 
of their duties oo bell all ol Uie-Named lristi~i . 
- - -----'3]7UlYll5~;.execulh4olffiifW6'9t'or employEi? of the Named lns-ured while acting:\'iithln 
the =pe QI their_~il~s ort~biiri'9!_.UJ_~_ Nariui~ lnstif.8d; 
4) Tha estate, 'the h~rs. assigns :iir-iegai repres~oi~tive~ fr, Iha event of death or lncompet1mcy of any. 
lndivijµal lnsuradu¢.~ this _Pol~; · · · · · · · · 
440073 (1/98) Page 1 ol 8 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
!'-
J 
r 
I 
f 
:I 
1· 
I 
r 
HCCCOMP _000327 
• 
• 
c).Oatm 
"Claim· shall mean a deJTiiioo received by the Insured lor compensation ol damages, Including the servi:a 
of suit.or instituµon .. of aibitratloo Pl:o¢~~1pgs agajnst !~ l~sured, · 
. . . . 
d) ·Loss 
1..oss· shall mean a rnotl¢ary ]uc!gment,.aw<!!d.or s~ttl~nr k,r d.amages lndt!dlng an award by a court 
of re;i_s,orlilllle a!fqr'n!l,Y's.i~s ~C9S~ t9;a,~ mak.f:ng Cl<!lm,:bot ~ ·es: ng(~ flf1!3s, penalties or 
any _matter u~r:fsurabla'under itieJav(pU~_ant fQ ~k:~!l]ls· f:'l?l!cY•:wlll b!i· e9nsti:_tled; nodhe.~wm of fees 
or.¢h<!'Qes Jo( th~ ~,yt~ renci!lf\ld .Di'.:iQJ19Ji;J~t:e:c!~ , • 
e) wi:o:hgf]JI_Ac:J 
-Wtorii11u1 kJ.• shall .. ~ :;u:iy,c~:cir,,allege<f:error. or. om\SSiah or breach· qt,dUfy' t.otnrnitt~·or- ~egad 
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Ill. CLAIMS MADE EXTENSION CLAUSE. 
If cfufing the Polley Period. lht,-lnsurod.lirst'be<;Qroos·;w\ire al any. speclilc ·ana ldentlflatile Wrongful Act and 
durjn.g th~ follcy pe_nocl ~ --~911.,IJPi~:1fW\J:ie.:i;oinP,c:iny.9f;_ 
a) the sp.,itjllo ~flQl~lfo#:· ~ ' 
b) the damage ,~ -,~a$ ,r;ir.:~ ·~ .l!lfJ'?o/.~ .c/:1 Wfori¢ui.A:t: an,( 
. c} 1h11 ci~Jances l;>y.,Y!h~ ih~ insJ.Jri,di~fa~~~ '.~l!:,ot su~\vrong!uj:~ 
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IV. EXCLUSIONS 
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_______ Jhls..Ec.llcy.~,or,~ le~ ..Claim 31'14 Clai!ff ~ens&s-:'------------;1-----c 
a) Based upon .or arising out·ol _any cl~0!18st, .crlml(lal,:fraµdµlert, maifclbu.s or rriteullonalWcorigfuJ Acts, I 
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b) For Dabllity arising out of the Insured'&. services and/or ~pacity as! 
·., 
1) an ottlcer, director, . partoar. lrustee, ot err(>loyee pt a· bosloe~ enterprise not named in the 
D~ns or a chl3(1!~8 oC93/"~11 OF ~l'l:Slc;,(1. ~~ai~, prolit-,!!harlog, mutual. qrlnve'strnenl fund • 
o(trust; 
2) a Jfcniclary und~_the Eiro~~e. R~t (~. Secui)ty.~ ~ ' W74 andJ~_wne(lllments or ariy 
n,3gu_~ri or oi'dei':isswi.d pu~~-.\hefe.!P.;of,\vith ~~Jo.aw E!.mpl(!;:~e.bllnel~ plal1 of a_n_l~ed. 
c) M~ b:(-:~ busit)ess,.erite:rp~:-Y!h~ is·~rated, nian~_"or ~~ ln"\Yhole:or in pa)'.t,cby the'N.Uned 
lnstlred orfue . . Name.·. d. lriiured'.s . ··. :co· ..... .. ·-.. cit- ... '.affij . .,_ . , subskl1~ru or '--••"-'31" ·com . : ... . . .... _. . . .. .. ~fil -'-o/-~ .. J:!o/- ... <\•~• ... ... o;a,:l•• . " - -. pany. 
d)_ Nts~;out of lrirt~eme1f o!::P.a!Eint.~.~l:it-.cir:trad~~rl<. 
a)· .Fo.rooo~y:~~l)'.i:sldme"i;s/ dl!:"e.al.1fc,r&atti".of art,:•pets°oi:i;,·o"dor emoibria!'distrass, me?Jtal ·ru,gu!sh, or 
i!ther. sfm.11ar Jnpry oi' dam~e, or;~}'.-]l)pry.to;° Qi d~lfon·~, ·a~ t'!lllQ_i~ll J>ri:ip~ry: or. loss. o( Use· 
-~iJll!(IQ_"~~rn.: . . . . 
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Civil Rights. la_w, laj'µlatio'°' ,pttjrdl~ii,nc~( · 
h) • Based upon or arising ot.it-of-a· violatlon or-alle_ged .violation ol the Securiili;s Act of 1933 as amended, or 
the Securities Exdlange·Act of ·1934 as,arnended, or-arrt-·State·e1ue•Sky or·£eci.1rlt1es·1aw or simllar state 
or Federal st.it$ al)\:i ·!Ir¥ regul~lbit .org.roai-~~ JX:i~~:fQ a)ly" ~ -.lhe foregoing sla1uti3s, .un!es.s 
endors\1(1 he11J9o.. . . . . .. •···· ... -· --: . . .. . ,. ······;.. .. , . .. 
. . . 
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otit oi-111e.1n·surecrs failiinfw·comni ·,----wn --····~:1aw:wit\.., ··'•,.:.,;;;., :to·the·:1 ·· · · ii' 'e · """· .:· -.. · · · · 
. . . . ,,r-_Y I!',, . ~ -.. .. . ,.,, fQS.,._ .... , . . . .. l)S!Jm s.. mp.!!'1ees C!lflcern1ng 
Work'&~ ·.~lim,. Urre:mployjni,dJpru.t.i~;, Social : S.ecinily ·o.r, D~bJty .. B .eoerlts. o1-. any. sirrillar 
iaw. · · · · 
_ic) Base~ 1,1poo.lhe ~ ;-~e.tWri~~)~m.e ~ _iy:·~=or1,ij14 -~ ~in!l.ii~tovfslo_ns o! arfl Federal, 
State or ~al statutory law ot: comm9n J~.. · · , 
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I) For adual or alleged vicl~ol the Rackel891" Jntluanced ~QOI1Jn!za!lons &:1· l '3 J l s.c § ™----,,---.....,.,.. 
et seq., and any amendments there!Q", or any rul~ or·regulatloflS pron:rulgat_ad 1hereunder. 
m} Based upon assertions, aflegati611s, ca,ises of action .or demands whatsoever by or.on behalf of q11 fnStJtBd 
or Insureds under this Polley against 'another Insured oi'"frisureds hereunder. 
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n) Based upon the actual pr alleged perfl?_rmanco or_l~il fallt.ll:e 10 perform by the ~s.any professlonal 
selV!c~ as an attorney, or the actual o"r -al_leged perfOrmanca or laii.lre ·1o pertorin arrJ pro{essilnal 
servi1;es as. an attorney b>/ any perSon or ently i.afalned or-e_lll)(oyed by the ~,oos. 
o} Dua· to, basi,d IJPO" or aif$ir(g 01,.1rqi, .i.Sr~ly odnd)r:es:11r. _l)lS:Uit)ngJrom onn c9_~equance oi. or ifl any 
~Y lnvoMn!,1_ seepage; polutloil'or"-cOJ.i!~~~-U.on.of ~ :kl!)d_. · 
V. WAM:R PF EX~l,JSIQt,m·~ -~~PN.tl.rri.6-~~ 
Whtlna~r, co~age µnif_er. any_~S:~:~ Jfus:.~ ~ -~J4:D.!!·-~~i(-.. su~etidQi;(¢ :i9st;• 
e) b iJse of . . . ·axcJUsio• ' eiati ,. lcfdl.;1,0M·st. . ·m · al;fi'~l'"rit, maficloti '. ·, -lrif irtlo:nal w·· ·n,,4 ·1-Act 9Ca arr:/.. . . . . Qr. ~.... "!! . . ._.r;, n . . .. , 8 • S ,;If; e. rou:;,,U s 
or oi"®s!Qiis.!;!,f :mi lris{Jred·"imcf)lljlji:resp.e~ -fo~ '.any:otti:er liisiJted did-,ixit 'pili.sonalr/j:iaitclpal.& or 
·persona1y:acqtikisce orremaln paj;"sivif atlet lw!nq'j>e"rsohal-kri~•ijg_tl ttieraokot · 
. _. . . •, ... ·:. . - · .. ·.:-_ -~-· ·-· .. ·--. ~ . . .. . .·. : -·: .. ·-.. . 
Q} becatise -of-Mll-a>rllpl~ ;wlih;<!tjy.C:Q~~IQn.re.~~,;ig 19· gfy!iJ.ifol;' noi1'¢e)o- ~ :CQ(l1)a.ny:.wati ~sp~ to, 
· --~~;:i:r~~~l~i~J:l i1r4~tt~~l~m~:~~-~~d~by-
. . ... .. :·· . •'••·· . . . 
~~~-=~::t~ai~~{~~~:,~~~~!~~r;:;.~r;s::~r:::!~.-
remain·P,~lva·a~e,·l:lav!n[~r-,p~i1l:~.~~;(~.!1.:Rr:,wi:e.9J:.it1~:?,tjs:"Qr.<>.ITT.~ .ns_9_~~ ~ -.anY,.~ · 
exclusion or condition: ~ci ~l-ttl:ia·~ iitiQ:onih<ii!h.Whic.ti.si.Ji.h. lilsifrao pan qjn'ply; atter tece~ing 
kmWlooge ~reot; the ·insured ~.rJ!iji,~cnc;,~ftie'.~enefi.t ol tr'iis ~;-of E;,ttjusJQhs ·a(ld Coooljl~s shaa ¢11lP.~ 
with such co~o11 pron:Jpfly ajter ~pi{ig°:kriqw!~: 9f .tna· !all.u~. of ariy ol:h!lr ireu·red or ~mpJoyee to 
comply~~ewith.. . 
VI. 1,.IMiTS ·oF UAal.U'J:Y .,. 
a) Dedoctlbte 
Tne ~e amount' siaJ;~ In. t!Jq.: ~ecl~atiqns: s~il\~':P,aU:l ·by .'the. if!~rt!d .aiJd -shail apply to -each. 
Claim i1l1d $8.» !~~:9f~TTl-~IJS!!.S. . . 
b) Mult!plil:Ctalms 
On1f.o:r more. Cl;iims b.as8.a:l1p0ri .o,-:a,!~;«Jt qt .tb.e.· Se-m8..W.('l:lngful.Act 0< iril.err$.lifd W!P.ll9fl{I .Ads by 
ona . o r.moia-Ol ·the i llSlli'eds°'.isfuilHie coniil&roo :i(sfo~i!c'Clalrri. 
cl 1,.lrillfof_Lliltlllity- • 
I 
" 
SUblect to the foregcill~j,"lp£! Compatjfs ~a.I il#Jlllfy"far l.oiis incftillrg Claim Expenses resulting from all 
Clqlms ilrsl m~ agal~,.ih~ J~:°~ ."9 I~ Po{icy P8:(19cfs~ n'ot exee·oo·lh_e amount.-stat.ed irl. the 
---111-- - -----r0ec_.,,..,.at;"'aDo=ns»:?:asr.r-1iJffit or:~; -~:a@j!3:Si:b~~!!It suqti payn:ie_nt· ~ fl)ada Tt_ie ln~1us1""'1on-'--o1-· --+----
roore . thao onQ (nsul'ecl hereilnder shd riot:~a\G" to-~8'-Jl)C(easa ihe ern01mt of.·~ eppfcable 
Oeducli>le nonhe IUJIOl,int·qf ,iie: ()9rr.pam/s ~ -of i.\a\)IJity, 11:l.e. Urnit of _UabiUty slµl!l_t>~.-excess of µie : 1 
·oeductlble ~nt. ·• 
.... 
~, 
' ~ ' ~#:=-~ 
P.age·4.cif 8 
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d) Exhaustion of Umlts of llat>lllty 
Tho Co~oY will not ~ liable io· pay any l.oss·.ot ck.i!Jl Expenses f?r continue th& .defense of any .Claim. 
altar the l,!rrill of Liatinity !Jas been ~b.aiJ:ite.d,. 
e) AJ~ion of Claftn Exponses . 
rn thQ ~!71 lhat:any p;:ii1J·go ·.of.if,¢1Mn·~ :r.~p~lj)a w~hl/1 l~ ;c;ov~ afforded ~ · li]rs Policy, 1he 
Company shall b.e entitll?(fto an allocatiort .Qf ·.C~rr.i Eicpe:nses ·~ired-on behalf of:1f1e• lrisurws '~ed 
upcm ~ i:atio a .~e,JiUm>'er Qf .¢l?.iitrts; c.liu~es.ot.actkm ot.~llonsfor.whJch.co.\l\ir~~·1~i;~~r-$d ~:ajar, 
this .PoBcy as· ct>r:Jl)8l'ed to Iha. roinbet ot.s;ucn.·~*;-.~ i;i't a~n ora~Jl~n:IS 'Wh/cH:ai:a riot with h 
:==h=~;~~=~~t~i:;r.~,~~~~,ti~~2::t !::: 
Vl.f; ~Rrrbftt 
-· ·--~. · .. ... ~-g~~~~~~~. 
.. ~-- : __ ·· .. · .. : 
VJII~ ~NDITIOt,1$' 
a) lmrured'.s:DUllas Jocttta:EveJitpf,,~,:A;t,)#atlojror:;~Wt: 
. • . .... :;;: . • . . : 
.~ 
Paga.S.of~ 
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l 
c) S&ttlemont of Clarm 
Toe Company shall not settle any Ctalm without lhe CQnsert of the Insured. If, however, 1he Insured shall 
refuse lo consent to aJl'f &ettlel'(leot re<;o!Jimef198d,by the Cofrl);iny ands.hall elect.to co~est the Clalm or 
continue any legal pl'OCeildl~ In oonneclio!}·wilh·su_ch Claim, l;hen·the Company's.liability for.the Claim 
stiall nol !IXCaed the aITlOUnt f or-which,lhe .cli!hn CCllld hav~ been S()'S8~1!!9.pl~· Ciab:n ~nsas Incurred 
up·to· the da1e of such reftl:;al. S9ch amoill)ts llnf~tbft!d.to_Hie p(ovlslons of Cla~ vi. ~s of .l..Jal?lllly. 
d) AlldA 
The Company may ~am1ne and au.iia-tl:ie lllStired's:books:ancl reocirds at any ilme .dtiring:ihe eonay Periop 
and after ·Iha. lln.al· le.rrnlnat19n. iif ~~ PQO.cy.':as::t,lf as_ tt:iey ·r~lale. tp lhe•.stiJ::iJiltj· m• ·ot:ttils PoflcY.· 
e) ~broglitlon 
fn:!heeve~.qt anr.Cl.ilf!! or ~(11 llnd"(~-~~;)~ ~~~'~I,~ -~ ·a~i1d f.o~ 8::(teO, 
ol such . miint lo :ali ~ 'of' iecovii '. . itii1rel01;':°and ihii Jnstir~: shal 1.ei<ecufa alt°.:<·.·. rs r . ulred and 
..... Pio/ .. ,. •'• ... , ....... . ,• .. ·:·-. /'! .. ·, .. .. -.·," .. •"! ·.--".· .. · ...... . ... , ... , .. ·- ,p.ilP_e ., eq ' . •,, 
shall, do liv!?&!hi:lg· tttat'"J'liay. ,b!t: ne¢.~~ry:jo;.:s~rs s_uc'(i ~s; -inclw3irig t~, ~e¢.ioon ¢ such 
dpcuf11~lsio~SS;arY IQ ~ :~~--~·~:iJ.i..~-~;~i~~'l():°ttie~~-pf.~)~~~-· The 
. !n~reds s~Q.QO.·Jl91f!lrl!:4't~r',G,1,37fTI ~,~ _M;9Qa,!flsti.J!:i~.¥:11.(ejup°191.~ ~i .Ai'IY~:~ .@~ shall 
, . . , .. __ _ f!f.~.~ ~!stwJj~_:¢q.lJl>~Jo.:~exft1l16it~'.'.'!~s.:<?',::G,!AAt1.:~P..l:~fi?Y'~ -~.-~ lite-·• 
b~e.p<llc:$·)Q .~he !~u~ H.~~. rP. ·,~f¢.!(19·~ajJ. ~~:;'h~ ~ajn-~ :anyJ~.urnd J.mi.~ :ii.q'l 
Insured is·~t:1 iwm.cowf~13J;>Y. f!l~.ri t;if:~4~P.J1:IY}(a~· 
f) :S0~.~::..be ru¢ass Jnsor~ ~r llflt-pU:iet Y.illic! . ./ll'l_ ~U.ect~:-1,:iwral}CS ·.avaJli\li!111~ .too 
Inst.tied whether Slic:h. ·other insurance •.-is. :s1aied·.10·::ba ,primal'y, corilril:(Jtory, "eXcess, -contlr@ent . o( 
otherwise, uriless such:ottier insuf.mcjj' Is wntten·.tirilyi as :a ~flc,eiio:iss-instirance ~ei'1he:Umit ol 
Uablfify provided ln !his PQJjcy. · · · 
g) Cancellation 
~ l:"oijcy_may ~ cal)C.e~eq._l:iy;tJ.i~ .~13,ci)~~ ~ ~i/~aj.~;dh~~t .~:.•·~ · CP.m_~ or. by 11'.)31fo;i 
~ .f;ln_.~fce:~~~/l)llJ'l!!.~~~;sµgj,_~l.~ n.:s~!31!§!!?:¢f~ •. :.~;qJ,f!C~~:P.Y.'th.eJpstlflW1,lli13 
born~ shal ra~n U:ia.:cust.oro~r.Y·f~-ll•taj~:~po.rt!?n b:flt1.r13~rn.~ ;~m!u,r.n, 7~:fyti9Y ~ :ajso tie 
cancell¢, witl:J. or.~ !ha· ~ur.n. l?)t: t~~.iir:~ ·~ )Ji.'lea:nw:~H>.(em.1%-J:lY- 9,r llri peti~II :tiflhe.~P.1!1¥ 
by deliyertng:to tte 1-Jilmed '~~·al lti1·h1oi:lrass'~t.fQrth_:ifili~·~!JSP(·i:l'J¥.?Plilg'to lh!l;t"ili:ned 
Insured.by maa, reglstere;d or unreg!st.er:ed, ~Uhi:(:~~:fr(iss:lr1jnti'.~t~nfn.Qt ·i.~ lhan. tiilny. (~O)~ays 
( or hm .(19) days. in tha,event:of-:r-Pll!p2Y~tit·qprijrillu~).wr.ittii n. notr~.slalin~·when-lha~a& alipn_shalf 
be, eff.ec!lva. 'i( caocillef;I bf ·~ ::~:~d~ ·.CQi'i,P.;ii:if!in~Wr~aln the:.p,r\J rala po./tloo 'at' the e'amiid 
prerplii_m. . . f:o·r 111\1:.purpq/l~ ot,i:«i'is ·~.; .. noi,tjl of .. ~flal!oi\'.~~n:·~a:'We:N~d l'l'.lli.Urea.,tiy·.lhe 
Corrpany .or.i1tven ib_ iJ-1e ~o~~i:iW:#Y~:~~Jn·sW,.i~··~r3.¥.iifii.{1lll~)'iar~·ragll s'liafbe:daemoo to 
b8 nQIIl:e cm.be.hall.of all lnsur~:Jie.re~e~-.' 
. .-.
If the period of' limitatlon ~alln{i·to th~ gjvi0j1 i:if no~:~, p!Ofii?.~ ·or: mad/3 yoid by any ·!Zf6 controning 
the construction hereof, sttj\ pe.~ ~ti~iJ't>e.~e~·\o .be a!TI!incfej;j so:~ 10. ba-equal·to th~ mllll{llJm 
----------,,,.noanr.nli'!lra!R5lt ~suqn 
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_..1;,t 
h) Extension of Polley .Per1ocl 
In the event of.canceDalion. or llO/l-fflflewal oi .lb~ Po,Jlc;y IQ ~ entirety by th.Et Company/this Polley may ba 
extended for ihe adcfdlonal period:as ~fld'i.rOtem 11 of·tha Declarations, for a ·prt!fl)~ril b:l:sed upon , • 
Ifie percent;ige as Indicated Jn tteri(12 of·tne: Oedar.illcins.of ffie total preinrum; Jcit:Cl~flro first 1rad/f 
against the Insured wring the ~ ~te~'96 p,eri6Ji,prciv:il.8d:: · · • · · · 
1) The W,:ol)~ul Pa gM.ng rls& io•such Clalm ~_'G9ipioilted i;>r•?fJegetj tQ.~a,ve b~n roo,n,ltted prior 10 
tl:ie aff~e,ctate .ot the cancellaikin otthe.i;>rl,~l~•«ipirntJo~ i;!ale, wii~er ~'l!P.P!lc,atile-.. and:wtiic!l 
woultl be otherwise l~ur&d 1>y:~ .PP,J)fr,·_~9[! 
2) W,;tta'ri ~ d :the. ~rclS!l:~·th}!; ·o~n~1,~iv.ep,~ ~}~aml!<lJ~ rn it!31Ji ·1 orni.e ~ta@oons 
· to the CoTTJ!any wlt~ln t_en ,(,1 P).days.•~er-m.iteff~ aat~ ot;~ellati9ri :or nc;iri,(enewaf;,and·· 
·3) Si.icfrad<fJtion.il rioo siiaiI be cieemecf- art of · · · · · rii · · .· ' Perloif ·· · : · · dd · · · · o; 
~. . . .. . ~ , .. , , . . ._, .... ~;-• .. !AA~ .. ~ . pP!lcy._ _<tl)df>ol ~J.! . . . lt~.ioo.~1. I 
4) F.or-.purpose, Qf stJch·add'rtlorial; . ri~ t:ov:e~$iB l,:e ' . -llciful~• on! \vitlt res·., . •fo •c1,iJmsJlist 
~-::~~=~:~l:f :i~i:;~,f~~; ~ :~9~Jft~~lt-iif.iijrp;;f~ 
The quotatk>n·.01 a f'enaYf?l p~n,)ufo,"h_fg~_Mii.iri.'.~~jr:/,,g Pf.~IT\ii.trn ~ -•a,~ , fo.oU;er-term$ or 
condltlof!3 'sh9) rp1.be 4ooinecl.~,~;a';_cii~~~~\#(Q9i:l.f~n~~lPr'~ c~~nyi · 
Q_ Action Af1alnst t~-Con'lpany ... 
No aciion shall ne against the Company uni~. as a~~iµpri pi-e,;sp~l1 inereto,.tflere sh.all have been 
full compliance with all of the te{lTl!; ·of-thls'~Jii:y; .. ocir·tmiff 1,rn1·amouirt.of the -lllsUrEld's obfrgatlon lo pay 
sha,U have been ffoaJly detem1f11e4 .eit~ by.J~tm~ ~gainst Jhe -inw.~ aft/lr :actual :trjal or oy writlen 
agr~~ _c( lhl! lnsw.e.~; Ill!¼ ~~l~. ;i.aj· l¼.'.epiw.arri: . . . 
a~i~n,11m11~1 
lnsurecl's-esta}e :shall rot ~(i~:va the Cpmp_WJY,¢./ar,,tri(a's-;cil:iU.gatlQ~ hereunder, • 
D Asslpnm~i:it _ . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . 
No assigorrietlt of Interest uod,3r th!s,'-F'ol.l~.{ ~ba.Jl.1:i!r1i;;Uryi,: 9i1~rir· \J~-ll.S :!~ pfiot-wnl!en COflSern Is 
endorsed heroon. 
• 
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k) Cllarnl~- . 
_______ Notice to oe kQO\l,j!edge posse~ed ~ _·ar:ry ~~r ~ 3f1Y: oJl'Jer ~~---~,.,l:i~m.f!~_~.f, -aaH',11<','(]l!/1~,i'8'!!-F-F -OiOFF-ia!l:--- - ------- -
changa In any past of U,Js Pol_lcy, nor est\)p_l~~-~ornp;i,ny. fl'\'.lJIJ-assei:t)ng any.~ ~~ tt:ie J.erms of this 
Policy. The terms oMt,ls Policy shall ~ol :be v-alved Of charg~,' BX<':&"' by em!:i_r;ein~JS$~ fo form ~ 
part of !his ~ollcy, ~d by 8!1 aulhorlzecf ~~ept~lye ~ th!J 6om!J<!% :,}.'. · ,,: : • •. , 
. ,-c·~': '! .. : . ·~'· 
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• 
• 
• 
~ Appllcatfon 
By accepaanca of this Policy, lhe l~reds. agree 1ha1 the statements-In the applicajlon are persona!' 
representations, that they shall b9 d&enJe(f~ti.H°lal -~ ~ -lhrs·Pollcy is issued In fuµan~ upo1fthe ti'uth 
of such represertauo ns arrJ ~ ihfs ·A511cy ~ml?od 1e;, ?,II . agreements exlsitng °between Uie lnsi,.treds and 
the Company or any of. lilelr--agents rel<\tln!I' ~Jhi$ ~ra~. 
mJ False or Fmudulent Clalr'r)51 · 
If any Insured stuin ~mmirt~d i!.J·~ _ljllf!'11,-a!li':¢l_al1T1._~~ "!~4s.azn.:,orit·Of ~!il!l!Wise;_~ls.lf)S!Jral)~~-
shaU b&come voict·-~ -1? ~uch f~ured frotn!~e-~a;svc;l:l f_ra~T!!~.C!aln:I 1$.'p~ff9re!'i, 
·I 
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oa,0312001 03:33 PM En do rs em en t 
NAMED INSURED: UTAH COUNTY :REAL ESTATE-, LLC DBA: et al 
NAMED INSURED'$ PROFESSIONAL DESCRIPTION ENDORSEMENT 
In consideration of the premium .cp,~ged,· it i .~· hereby u,nd~rstood 
and agreed that Item 3 of the Decla:rations,= the .IJ.N~d Insured.l's 
Profession", shall read as follows~ . 
3. Named Insured•s Frofession: 
Solely. in the performa,nce. ot · s..~~¢$, ~ · .a Real, '89.:t;~t.:e -]\gent/Brok~ 
of non-qwned p,=ope:rties .. ; ·;!;or, ·others· :fl;>:r;. a:.. fee. 
.AJ.,l. other terms and conditiops -renjaj.p ·.wichanged. 
Endors~ent effect±~;_ il-/"1.6/06; ~ ' :~q;L:t.o/-).iq\ H.7.Q.t :-;174~4 
Endorselllent No. 1 
Professional Indemru..ty Agency, Inc_ 
liMP ~-32 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
os,0312001 oJ:33 PM_E ndo rsemen t 
Named Insured: UTAH COUNTY REAL ES'tATE, LLC I>BA; et al 
NUCLEAR INCIDENT EXCLUSION CLAUSE-LI1\BILITY-I)XRECT _{BR0AD) 
In consideration of the prentl.urir charged, it is m:iderstood'... and agreed 
that this Policy of Insurance .d~s.· not appJ.y-~ 
I. Up.der any L_iability ·co:verage_, . t;q _..µijµxy-,.· ~ickµ~e;~, cµ;s~_"'se, death. 
or destruction ·· 
{a) 
{b) 
with res~c:·t to Wfll~h.: :~ :ii?:,sji;~.4 . vri!I,e_~- ,th¢:-P.~;!.3.):;y . .t_=;i: ~l~O ari 
i.n'.$1.ired :under . a.. -:.riuc;~eaj:- iaj}_t#rgy. ::J::il;a.J?;J._;U:;:y- j;,91.i,cy i~sµ_e<:i .by 
Nuclear Exi¢X:9Y Lia:b,il·it#, · J:#s:urari:& :-~soc1at:~_On.;: ·Mutual·· ~tdJnic 
Rne·rgy Liabili."t:y un~~rwr:itei'.-.$; 'qr: Jiu:_cl$.':!,':} ~c:e_ .As_sti:¢:iat:ion 
of. C~<ct,Q,a,; e>:t' ~0~1~·. ,~ , :;;µl. :;,;i.cil..§iw;.~ -AA~.r :,~ :-~q_q, p,o.11,cry:);>ut 
for· it$ tennioat~on· upqµ. ,_~~ti·oxi.-.'.of . i:t,i ,J.jm,it_ of:, :J.iapil:ity.;· or ... .• .·. . . 
~~;r~~r r~~d~~~fo. ~ j±~~:r~~,~@~4~9G~ *.~f~!~t.~~r:i~ 
require~ J::0 - · · ma.int·~ :~\Rajj._c~al. -p,)t!'?.tectlqn: __ :pur~u,~t .. t,,::r the 
Atomic • Energy A,¢t· .• of. ·1!9"~;4,.,_ .;p:i:;: ~y ::t~wt'~ -~~~-·-t'.ij~¢ot:,., ,ot: 
(2) tl;l,~ ~mi,t:eQ.. ;LI?-~ :;9.;--: P?,µ : K.h:U'F:p.i:lp:;,9.Y.,_;µ,q;~; J>.~ :. ;~-~-~¢.. :w,qu;ld 
be; ent_it.1¢4. tq: j,np.~i.J~x· t i~-1$~ ,q~t-~.4 ~t:~t:¢~. ,p~· -~er:i:<~~.-
or .a.i}Y· ~g¢n.¢¥ tliire{j~~; Juiq~_Ii::\:i#--f '~gl ~ i P.:~-~~¢~~4 1m,t.o .. by. the 
Uni:ted stat:e·s · ··of Am~r1:'i;:~':,: . iqr"·_·: ~Y, ·ag¢:n,_cy_ tli,~~e!=:>f;;,·1;;1tli any 
person or oi:ganizat.!oi:L . . .. .. . . 
II. Under any Medical Payments: Cc;,y.¢r~ge,.,. o:i:- under ~y SUpplementa:i:y 
Payments Provision relating·_ to. 1.IIllil_e"iii.~te _-m.e~,ical o:i;: ,:s:urgical 
relief,. to ~enses il:icµ;rzi~ ,~.itli :re~~qt::, -~~- -~ly -1._njii;l=Yi 
sickness, .disea$e pi; d~tjl. -:;;~.~ -~iµg, -t~.011\. t,~ · n~;z:a;:r;d,o\ls 
properties of ··nu<;!l¢;ar ;nra.t:~r.ifa:F ':a'ficL :a:t~s~~,{'.i;,~t :,ii: 'ilie ·°i;)p.erati.on 
of . a nuclear fa.td:J.-i-ty hf'-ali.Y :pers.6n;.91( ·tj•tga::'1;1.t:zati9ii-~- . 
: . . . ~· ···~ ...... ··. . . . ... 
. . 
I _I':I. Under airf Liability . (pY.~~~~.i:. J:i<:!;_ ,~~'i+-:i:y.:~ ,~5.-;c~~~,~(,: .!;i;i=s,~S;~~- d~at~ 
or destruction :r;:e_sulting frgm '.f;-4.~, ¥.'~ ..¢,ac;ru.~. ·p~P.¢r.~~ia:,i· o.f: -liucJ.~-
.lllflteri:al, H -- ··· · 
(a) the nuclear material f;t) -;:is . •a:t .. any. iiui:!lear··.i;-ac;i'1i.t_y\ :qwned by, 
or -operat·ed by · or b.ti _;_ ~ l tit~· _any i:tisu.:tf!d or·· -:C-.il :4as :heen·. 
di~cbarged qr disper-s.aj., :~~.r::~J~qm; · · · · 
-Cb} the nuclear matei;:ia").. .-;LS: .c.6n,~ .in. sp-i~nt· Juel o:r w.aste:. a .t 
any. time possess¢,. :~i;ttea,· ~~; pioces!=!~, stored, 
transported or dispased of· :bf or .on ~a.J.f of an insured; "dr 
(c) the injury, sickne.ss, d.i_s~!i?:e, <;le.atl:i .o.r de.stru.~t±p~ a,x:-,ises qut 
of the furnishing' by <Ul · insu:1/ed of· services•, roaterials·, parts 
or equipment in coz;me·cJ.;i.on, wit;~ :t"b.~_. pl;µm,ing, cqns.tz:µctio~, 
maintenance, opeµ:ati¢>n or. tis,e of. :any nuclear. faajJ.it;y; hu.t it 
such facility is lo"i::a;~ed -~i"th.in the ·United ·St~te_s of America, 
it•s territories or posse~siqi:is or Canada, tlus exclusion (c)-
applie::; · only to iliJury.· t,i;i pr-. clestructio:n of property at such, 
nuclear facility. 
-+-• ~ _ , _ ---··-· 
-J"leeeoMP ...:.000336" 
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NUCLEAR INCIDENT EXCLUSION, Continued 
.IV. As used in this endors.ement: 
Page 2 of ;2 
"hazardous properties" include radioactive,. toxic _or· explosive 
properties;- "nuclea,r mat,erial" m~an.s .soµrc;:e .rc:iater-ial-, . s.~c:ia;L n~cl¢ar 
material or byproduct materJ:al.:; "·$.tiUrce·- mater1.a·1 11 , "i3pe9;i.al. nµc:i.ear 
rpaterial", and 11bypr0duct material,." ·have tll~·,m~~gs ·g:i,y~ ~~II\ in 
the Atomic Energy Act 1954 oi: in -.µ;iy-. ;:ta\oi; i;llllep,d.atq;cy -~~t.~of_; , ;,~p~t 
fuel" means any fuel ele)rtent or<:Eu.e'l: 2,9ht>onex1-t;. -:a-o:;I,id qr l:iquid, wpich 
has been used or expos~ to .racliati,bi:t .ril:/a. nuclear: 'reactbri ,•.-:wasteti 
.~ans any waste mater.ial . (1), :Goti.tai:i:1i.ri\:f 'l?'YP.r.o.duc~: !1$ter:l;al a:q.d. (;2J 
resµ_ltin$'f f:i=om the oper.acl.0it by:~$= p'~$pn., _ _.oi:-· org$i~tiori--p.f-~Y . 
. );:lq._clec!-r facilj,ty -in:~lude_q :\'r.i;tl;rin., t~¢ :¢!.~.~µ:µ_ttc;:rr~ .'qt ·o.µ~J.,~:. 't'~:c;;;i;_J,;l~y 
tu:!-d~r paragraph . (a) ·. or (b) "tl:ie:r:eo(;:icnv.P:i¢ar,·-.cta/::i;litj."· 1:ine.ms-, 
. . . . . . -~ 
.(a} any .J?.UC;l:¢~ ·ri;!~ctfoi; 
(h) 
(c) 
uranium ·233_ ·or any ,cohthiriat:"iOli thereo'.f.;;. or'·'iiiore' 'cha:ri 2s.o· grams 
of uranium 235; · 
(d) any structure, basin, ex_ca~tioµ., -premises or pia~e preparep. 
or used for the storage or .disposa1 ·of waste; 
and includes the si,te on whii;;:l.i. aµy :P~ :-th~ _fQ~~gq;iµ;g -ls loccit;~¢; all 
o:i;ierations con.ducted on ·such site ,:apd !a)& :p:i::$i·ses •~sed, ,,for· ·sucp.-
=~~:.~~b1e1~~ff !:Io~e~tt=~ffi~~!,~!ttih~f:l ~::~tf; ~~: ~~~Q ·ta 
cqntain a criticaJ.,ma,ss o:£ --f;:ts:~i~J~,-:ll.lat.~:a.1, .'·-.,~1t.h .. :11e~p¢ct:. -t<r 
:i.P.jl.l,:)'.:y to or des½"ructio.J:1.. 9f· p~.op~::iz:t,:y-,.: :t,qe ~~q:x::d;-· "J,njµ_:i:y"' 1p_r·:: · 
"~estru¢tion" inc;:lup.¢$ al;I. --~fo_~- 4{;;\i;~~~¢'t'.i.~. ·iqnJ:~~ti_qi;i. p~-
property. 
It is understood and agre¢cl tli.~:t,,;_ ,_;,_6c.c:~1;r~ :as: ~peclti:c_~Iy,. J?,:ifOld-aea: in 
the foregoing to· the; contrary-; :ew:1:t ,clatise.- ·;far •~ti.b_ject to: th,e .. tenns.; 
exc:iusiori.s, condi ti_an.s -~ :IJ;m:_if;-q.t,j;pn.11> ·.o~'. ; t}Je:;· J:eit:i;~,i~ate . (1)i: :i;:im_ur:~ce 
t;9 which. ;i.t. is att<i.c.l;l~- · 
It is. further . unders.tood .and agr~d· that t:bi:s· :roJ,icy has: a .25\-
minimum .earned premium cond.J.tion·. 
Al1 other terms and conditions rem~Jn u:ncllang.ed. 
En_dprsement effective 11/26/D.6 
Endorsement No. 2 · 
HMP E-46 
E46 
-··--
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os10312001 03:33 PME n d a rs em en t 
NAMED INSURED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA: et al 
In- .cons·ideration of the premium- charged( i '.t is hereby underatood and· 
agreed the section of the Policy en:tit+ed •II. 'Pefinit-i-0ns, 
part e) , Wrongful Act", is amended tq include the following: 
Wi_th .re1?pect to the Ip.sured •··13 professiop. a~ ~tate_li in It.~ .- . t ·o·f_ : the 
peclarations, WRONGFQL AC'!'. i;J:iall . a1s·o .m~a.µ,.~y actu;i.l. or ·.a.l.leg.~d; 
i .-. Libel'· sl~er or. ·ot;:her .-fo~~: 0~ :A¢J,~_t"i.9~_;-· 
2. Invasion or iofrip.g~ent of· the-: r~$ht·_ :di; :I>'.rivacy ·?t '.i?,ublit:ityf 
3... .i?iagiarism·, pir.,_cy :e:>r ·:mis.app;ztqpr,'la,td.~: _o-,:..: 'id~_as.'. 'und~;r: · inlpli-'cii 
cont;z:-ac~. · ·.• ·· ·.,. _: , ·.·· · · · · '· · 
:tt is ·aJ.ao understood a,np: <!'.gree.~: ·t.4~t.i :,~il;)istq* "l"; :d; :t}#:s : P:.i;,1:±."c,;y· 
is· delef°ed :u:i. its entirety··:and .r~plac¢"i:l/ :wi.t11·:it;lie.· '.foHowiii§'.,":· . -.. 
f). ·to iµ!.y clµ~ ~mi cl~tin expen!=!:~a. :~i:$'~g-:_o:u.ti.-:P.t : -tiJ ~~~~ a;r:J;~st;, 
9-etention or ·_a.mprisq;mieµt:; . .(~j ':l:•{i;:p:r,_gfi_tjl. ~~gy _Qr: -~Y.~9.·1;jp~r;;.-,. pr 
iIJ.vas?-on of. any right of· pr:i,.v;ate: ?.J;:~u~~y., . 
It is further understood and c;tgreed· ·-that ·this · .·Policy• does not 
apply: 
1 . to any claim and claim exp·~13e;3- . ~i.si1;:r.g- put' o.f or_- co_nnected 
~t.h. . th~ .per;f:.orro.an_'?~- :°.F. q,:t:· :;.aj;,1~;~:- :'.l;Bf(~:~TT~~-.'~~-~ :c,~~--;~~-.,~ -
J.JJ,!mrance. a$~nt _;. 1~u;"?U19~: ... :p,r9lc~;r,-;: . -,~q:t;~g_a,g~::J?~~p_,;: ;~Q~~g~ge · 
broker, -escrow age.tit, ··pr.oJ:>e~-{de..v.eiop.e;r:, 'bu±0lde_r _;1 .c .~n-structiori-
man.ager, or li1ro~er~ tiiaria$,.er? · · ·. · , · · · ·· ···· · · ·· 
2 .. to .µiy claim and cl.aim ·expen:a~. :a.J;i.a;tng_ o_µt; :of -any· .-Insui:;ed 
waki:p.g_ warranti~-~ or gm;1,r~t.~_es_ .a;s:. =·t;cr r,:pi'y. fyt,~r.~ ··\?:_a).1.1~' pf:: ci.ny 
prope1;"ty; · •.•. 
3\ to any claim and cla'.L~' ~ -~ns~_s. ip.';i;s:iµg'· :~t:_: of, _ ,nq:ti,irized 
ce:t-t:i:fication or ackn:owledgemeµti-. ·:of . :a, ··iG,gilat.ur:¢ ·w;tthout:. the · 
phys"i.cal. appearan.ce at the· . time of :said .'not:ariza.t -ion-. ·refor:e, 
s:ucl;l notary public as in~u:x::ed ~~e,µig~;r -- of· t:pe :per,s.on. '!flit>. is or 
cl~ims to be the person signing.;: 
HCeceMP _000338 
oam.312001 03:33 PM End Ors em en. t· 
4.. to any claim and c'laim expenSef:I_ ·arising .0.ut of or connected. 
with any tran:sact;;ian in whi9);i_ 'a.DY. lnf!!ured, ~a- a d:irect a~ 
i~direct beneficia). owneraiµ;p .ft...i:l.t~re~t; ·a.a, ~- buye.r. or. ,i=i:e~l~r: pf· 
real property; ho!,i1,eve1:,. this ·~¢l#a;i:on; d¢s. ·µ.o·t : app1.y -.t:~ :i~a.l: 
property to which -any ixj·sti);.~4, ~~-!3· t,*-~· j:egaJ,. titi¢ ,)iio).;~ly .. for 
··i.Iimiediate resale . and ·has ent/ei:ed· . :i.'ht&: . a ·· ·w:cit:iteri. .: coritract., :to 
:·seil not later than· ·n:inetr: -(9"0} ·~ys; ·aftext: t:.akin~· .. 'le~ 'title:; 
5--:. :to _:.;µiy cla;i.i.n and cla.~ -~~i:;.ei;I, '.•~~ts~ng -o:ut . 9.f;_<;?t- ;c;9~~t:e~ 
·With the formulp.,tian., : ~:r;o~t1i"c?-n.·.. . 5.}'.l:ldi:.c~~-iop,-; . __ .qf:te~:, .. ~4e·. :or 
management of any linil ted· <;i:i; ,g~_µ~zjj,I. ,p.?,;rt#ei(I.P4p. ·p:i;: :arJ.y Jp.te.i'-
es t · t;b,.e.:r;ein. ; . 
•ii.i . other tenn_;:s and coo.ditioµs :t;~{µ;_ :qµ~:~~g. 
];!tidorsement effective 1.1./2'6/06 
Endorsement No_ 3 
In'c. 
HMP· E-17 
HCCCOMP _000339 
osm3120O1 oJ:33 PMEndorsem_ent 
N;AMED INSURED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DID\;: et al. 
ORGANIC GROWTHS. 'EXCLUSIONARY -ENDORSEMENT 
I~. q::>n$_iderati~ .. of. tlle. p~Ul,ll_ .C~afg~_4_,.. -it i_s _:~e,r~l.>y -µµ4¢;'_st-qqd •@ _d . 
. ~~d th.at tjri.s eoJ.1.cy- .s~l.l .~t:? '@.p:iy· J:o.: ~ -.. :J:ici,. -~~~ag~ :..;aµ · 
:_:~~~;
9
~t,~~e;0 I~ ~~~~;1, ~n~~~~~;.~:~;~t:r~~}.~-~:~;~:~~:• 
l;;ase4. \W.on, rel.ates. ~a, or . .a:r.1.se.~ :•_9:J,11:· ·of ·t:he· 'fo.rma.b.on·, ·grow.th·;: 
:presence, release,_. msper"ii;al-,,. 26nt~~t:.:. ~~l, ft:es:b'ing, :;¢r;. 
: or· .-q;~tecti.on :o;r ·.li)op:i-tor;i..~g of; -~x ·.:i!J9.t~,~-: )f:in'ig¾,, ·:~:JX!t-~;$_,. "Q~, -:~~~¢'r,: 
'&5Jru..lar ·:growth~ or o~ga·ni~ ~tee,:;,. _(mc'.!,:tid:i:~g. Jiut: -ti~~ ~t.e4,: _:1;::9. 
-a,s9.e,;rgillµs, p~nic,i.ll.iunt, 9r :any· 'fi,q=a,!~-..OF.' tYP}~ :.9.; _·:.st"1.~yj?p.q:-.;i~,,_ 
-~~nunqril.y· co~l.ect.i-v:ely re~1;irl;-eA -t<;S·) ~-J;I-_ tl.:1/" · !lil:J,~ql,c, . .-~:/:,~,tt:~- · 
A,:Ll o"t.her terms and :cond'itio!15. -remain :uµc"hl,in~e'd·, 
Endorsement effective 11/26/06 
-Endorsement No. 4 
"in,n>. E-127 
~ii7 
HMP .Polier· No. H706 -:17424 
HCC.COMP _0003:40 
oam312001 oJ:33 PMEn.dorsemen-t 
NAMED INSURED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, IJ:.C DBA: et al 
In consideration of the premium ch~ged, i"t is h_ereby understood 
.and agreed that coverage afforded by tltls .Policy is hereby eJC;tended 
to provide property damage. ari•smg .from· the use anq. .op~:i;ation 
of a . lock box. A $25, ooo sublinµ:t shall apply ft>r the lock p~ 
coverage afforded in this endoi:sement._ Thii;: suh).in>it of liability 
is p~t of ancl not in addition to the limit of ·1iability stated in 
Itelll #4 of the Declaration Page. · · · 
:tt is furtper understqod aµd agre¢ th,at th,e seq,t,i<m., pf·_ t,lus· l?olicy 
entit,J;'ed ":'IV. EXCLUSIO~S, part q);, .'Shai:t_:.n9~ -ap,g;i.y i:;9 c1a,ims. 9.¥.~ 
\.ipoµ.- o:i:: . arising out of. Wrongf~. ~c.ti;; i µvolvip.g :@ I:nmu:-ea:{~: . 
_ta.:µ~e. t? ~sc;:lose th~_ e¥-$t~ilc~--·o,t 'I>P.t,+:4t~1;:~ < ~; ~ub+iii1~t:-
·o:f ·.lli.abil.1.ty of $500, ooo in ~e ·agg;reg_at:e .:sll_al.1 :~:[>J?ly:· to _ 
J:.hi"s cm,erage. This · sµblindt of: .'l~abil:i;t,y .. \:iii3, p _a:i:;t, o.f:: a;o,ii. n_ot; 
::1;n ~ddition-J-o the limit of liab.ili·ty i:3f:at:ed ,in. r:tem 14'. of 'the 
P¢c):ari;i.tJqii P~ge. · · · 
-:i;~ is f~tp.~ Ull&;!rst~ ani:l: a9+.~~ 1:~t.;,_(;~~- _;tj:\4;~p~i;leµt;. t!pn.t~a.<;!l:PX::B, 
pf .. t;ti.e: · •~a.med I~sured", . are cov¢:r~d ~i?:.t.~:Ly l .Pl':-: :~Mii: ._p~o~essiqµa). 
-s·efrvices :provided on bebaTf. ·-of tJ1e .11~fu:l!id-iXns11te4"·.: ... . . . . 
. . . '. . .. · ... •· ... ·. . .. .. . . 
·;r_t ::l$ f'.l)rtber u:nderst.ood ap.'¢l agree4. t}la;t ¢Xc~µi;i:-ion: g} , 9~- l2,i:H.; 
P,blicy 0is delet~d iu its ~t:ireey, p9-l:~1y:,~~\~:_iJ:ceg~<i:$.- to c:i.~:L ) .. fl:W 
s_uiJ:s ~t seelc monetary ~g~~-, __ :Tlie.~g, _·,¢.iy.i~. };?)(. ~~.:iJs_ ·q~9t -~ . 
l,,_ro:ught_ by or on behalf of any curre*~ t?i.'' f:i:ir:~~--,pap:lle):', ex:eciiµye 
of·ficer.,- director or employee of. the Naltle~ Ini:;ureii. 
AJ.l othe r terms and conditions rema:.iri. ·unchangecL 
_Eµdprsell)l:!llt E:ffective: 1.l_../26/06 
''Eildprs~t NO. : 5 
m,u>, E-161 
HCCCOMP:_000341 
• 
• 
• 
oa,031200103:33 PMEndorsem.ent 
~ ·INSURED: UTAH COONTY REAL E.STATB, LLC· DBA,: et al 
In consideration of the prenu..um charged, it .is -hereby unde:rstood-
an4 agreed that the section of· t.hi$ Policy Titled 1:'V'J:II. 
CONDITIONSff, part h), Extens~on of ~oltcfy'· Pericil;l -i~ deieted 
iti its entirety aI;J.d replaced with =the· ·follol\lJ..P.9'.-. 
h)· Ext·ension of Policy Pe~iod. 
~h tjle event. of can~~llation or l;lqn,:--~-~~a):; :.~t.: ' ~~'?3 ·.P.~~.ic.y :i;i:i 
i:ts' entirety .by the Comp;my or: the·. ';[p.!=iU~d;: ·,hhis,. PQlicy.· l!!,cly ,b¢· 
~t~td.~d·: :toi ~e additioQ.cµ p~fo·4. ~-~t ·144l~.~t.@ .. fu. ,:r:t;'~ -- ·J,i ·~f. t .h~· 
Bclig_dtil.e, for a p:i;einium b~sed .upcm. :t$.e j?~.l,;~~:t:;?.ge.: aif 1:nl;U~ted,_.._ ix,: 
Itci,n i2 o ·f the Decl·aratiops · pf the: t6ta1:. prenu.fun:,, for- ,<;Hai:ms. ·fi:rs·t 
mfl.d¢.: agc!,1.nst .the Ins:u~- \:hi.ring J:b.e,. sa,i'd.-'i#kten:,;iion ·.W1Qd pi::ov.1.t!ed~ 
i} ·:i~ Wro.ngfµl Ac.t -giviµg· r:,ise·· ~o . ~µ¢1.i.-.-:¢.J·~,W: ;i~.- q~t:-~_e4_-·P:c.' a;i~~g¢d 
to· ·hav:e ·been co.mmitt.e~ ·pr-.1.or 't:q :i:b~ ·ef£.e~ti~: dat~ ;'of. ·th~ ·.canc~l.-: 
ta·t1on or the original e;x:piratron ·pate•~· •.whi:c;hever.· 1s· app:licah':le,. 
'2..) :·.;~tt:!c~o~~~;d o~\~~~t~I~;~dr-~®,:;jf;J~:J~~;f~¾.r:i :·t~~-.. 
~N'smecl Insured ±n- Item 1 .of Hie, D~c;ljuat:iqn·1;i t-'~,.th.$,.':<:;o~paiiy ~ithl:n. 
·ten.{10.) da.ys a -fter the effect:i'v'e·~ d:ate :.oi;: :cana~lat:.i;oi''.1.- ·.o.r=·non.~. 
.. .x::.en¢wa1.; . and . . . .. .... ... . . 
·'~).. ,~ .c.ll addlt:lonal pe~<;>d. sha;tl pe. :c;le.~4 . .P.?l:~~,·qt: the .::~µ',i;n.g_, 
·j?.o,l;-:,i.cy P~r.iod and n9t arj. ad4•it.i® ·,~~'ri:¢.t.o.,@:~t · · · 
4.) ··?ot _pu.rp<;>se.s of such ~dditi~n.~'J. i,~*~QP-:, ~qv~t ~g¢• -.t,ilj,~l], :~ ~~pl;i-ca,bl~ 
-i;µ:r:l.y with respect to 't;:;J.aims- fi.i;:st ;~qe: :~~t. t:$:e In~µte.c'fa·. d~p1n'g 
such additional period. 'l'he prdvisfQns· of· Cla,use n:i:' of 'this 
Policy shall riot be applicabl.e to such -addi·tion:a.l period-; and: 
5) Th~ limit of 1iability applicable to :the ~,:.ended Discovery Pe:x::iod 
sliall be. only the remaining: J,,i.nut:; oJ l?,.aJ:>:tI'.ity· ayai)..,;µ>le uµd~r 
µi~ Policy .and no add~·tional J:·t~-t; qf' l;i,api;t:Jle,y-.sp.al;L. be. 
-~ppl_icabi~; and · 
·Tp~ qu.~tati.on of a ;r-e'newal. px:~mii:im' •lµ.g~. J:J~ . w-:·:tll~·-ezj?;lring.' p:ri~\llll 
:c;ir.· a : ·change in other terms or coridlt<i'oiis slial.1 tldt :J;e · deenied. to 'be · 
ai ~a:ri.ceJ..lati.on or oon-renewa:\. by tjJ:¢. Coi:nj;>:aP..Y,.- · 
·,iU_l .other terms and condition~· rt;:lt!.µ:;n -.~c'hpn:~~-~-
:.Endorsement effective 11/26/06 
Endorsement No.. 6 
--'------------------'------+iiof~Q)aa-l:-~-t:-y-Agen.cy-,- J;n·•• -----
l:Q-iP E-13.3 
E133 
HCeCOMP _000342 
os,0312001 oJ:33 PMEndorsement 
~ INSURED: UT~ COUNTY RRAL ESTATE, IiLC DBA:. et al 
.Di .consideration of the premium charged, :it i 's. ·hereby understo'qd. 
i:U;l~ .. c;1.g;reed that this Policy · sba,11 ript aEJjlt- to' ;and .co:ver.a9e, ·sna-1;1. 
.nqp. h~ .afforded for apy Claim and. Cl.a.i.in ·~ns.es. based, ·upon o:i;. 
i;l'l,t';i:.s'l.µg out· of .the· ·sah!, management, ·:1,~~!:Cqr , .. r~~: ·O.:f; ·:@y ·.l{e.al: 
·~.~,~~te: ·1(}qi;J.ted. in the state q:f; 0¥,:ffo,iµ'.i:<:\i . . 
7 
• . 
-
HCCCOMP _000343 
I 
I 
os,031200103:33 PME ndorsemen t 
NAMED I~SURED; UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, :LL_C •.DEA: et al 
PENDING/PRIOR LITIGATION ENOORSEMENT: 
In·, consideration of the preinium- ch,aj;g'e<i"; !it, -:is :hereb.y ·underat:QO~ .and: 
_qgr_e;:e.o.· t;liat this Policy exciudes· at:i: ·ojafrps .afttLc¼aipi~ exp¢nses.: . . . . 
. :<'3,'~:;i.sµ;ig ~-rem .i.11 pending or pri_qr 1:1,:t;i;g;;).h,;i,pp._, as, -w.e.],l a..EJ ··:fu.):.~~· ,c;::l(a;iius 
-~±s:ii.::i;ig ou.t d: said pending or ·prio~ • b :t:i;$~U.9P..s _ 
1¥11 other terms and conditions rernaln unchan.,9-:!;!d,. 
Endorsement effective 11/26/06 
~ .E-34 
E34 
HMP Policy No. HT0.6-17424 
HCCCOMP _000344" 
os,031200103:34 PMEndorsemen t 
NAMED INSURED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE., LLC DBA: et al 
SERVICE OP SUIT CLAUSE · 
As u,sed in. this endorsement, the " Company11 · refers to Houston, Casu.aJ.ty 
Comp1:U1Y• 
!hrls applies in jurisdictions where. the Cpmp~ . .i._s not- a.µ ·a.dmitted 
•iruriirer .-
:c~ is ag·reed that l.n the event of ·th~ .Company.•,s -failure to ·pay· the. . 
~oµ:n~ 'cla~d to be due _hereunder, tJie ·. Corti:p~y-, :a:t: the .r¢qti~st. of' the 
;i:ns.u,:z::ed,. will sµbmit to the ju:r;iscU.ctj,.iJO . ofj:1µy." -~@~.t of· ~~ete1;it:; _ 
'j_~f!i>di~tion .within the United St~.-t:~~ :-~a· ~ill. _c;:OIIJP.lY wi:tA: ·a:fi,. . 
f~iie!iient:S ·necessary to· giy~ ·mtc~ .. GPo/!: -j~_;\~Q,1,~1,9~_ ,~4 ·al) . . ~t:t:!;!:rs 
arising. hereunder shall. be .deterinined in accordance ·with the la.wand :e"~~sfic~-·.of. aucll. cqurt. . . . . . .. ... . , ..... .... ·.· .... ,. . . . .· . ' ... . 
x.t .. dis .furth~- agreed that-, pur.suant_ "tq ;l;tify.. ·sta.t:ute:.,o:f• any · state:,. 
-~!:!:pri;to:r;y ·or dist:x::ict of the ·tJni.t¢d Stat¢a: wh:i~ .;Illajt~s- ··p;roy.i:.d,c>n . 
. . t~~:i::_~tqr.¢, tjle· Company b,e:i;eb_y d~!=!:i!gµc;1.t¢S. ,:~J~)~~$µpe;,;;µ:i;t$.g.~~,,.. .. 
¢~~13~iqne~ _or Dir.ectpr of" 'Instp:~ce :,q;· -g~pl;l.t/q~f.iq~ J:1pe~l:_f:--:l-¢: fi:rr. 
itl:i~ti p~i;pose in the statute, or his- $1:l-Gcii;:_eo:i-£ lor -:sµ'cde$sOifi $i :Gtt~ce-; i:i~~~~~~e ~d a~fr~~ =~~~~!~~~6:~;~~ ~ ~r~~~r®· '~~~~~~i~ 
:oft-. :the ·.):nsureo. or any beneficiar:y ,:he";i::~i.ina.ef:··~:1-:fi#tS: o~t 'b;J;" ·th-~if-ffe:>licy 
~J. ::1.1]$.\1,rance, ~ hereby dei,;:1,.gn~t,es· :t):);e_ .'P;i::'¢1;1:lq.¥.i-t: :q:f t:~~·-'H.9@.~q~ : · 
t~s~ fy • 9omp_any in care. o-J:. · t ·:qe_ -~e:r;i:i.':!,,. qqµIl§_~;L~ ,a;t:; · :f~40_~ , ~qz.;tl;lw~_~ti' 
:F:t'ee~y ~ Houston, TX, 77 04 0, as_ .the pe::i:so.p..· ·tq -Wb.orii the, si:iio . 
9t:ti¢er is authorized to maiJ. suc'.h prodei:ft. .oi. t'ril~ i;r;;py. thereof. 
It _is further understood and agreed that m~rvi:de .of process 5.n such 
$1.µ,t may be made upon CHRISTOl:'I;rSR !,. ~'.'!.'~~ A..t.tP:r;I_J¢y-~..,_Fact;.., ~t 
:J.t~P} ·Nc;ir.thwest Freeway., Houst,C>;n, TA, :77_0:~p:/ -.~d.._:that ,:1:Pi aJ.1.Y :suit; 
:i,:n.1/tii:u te9- against a,::1.y one. of. :tj:l,em .. up9X1·. :t;lii~_.' 'Cp:p,t:tact,: ;; lJnq.e~l.:t,e_;-)~;, 
~:).): ~lde by t:he ·f _inal d#c:isi~ of:: ~~~P.'. ¢'p,¢.'t '<;>~ .oJ at:lY ~pp.e,'.(1-'3:t:;~ 
Cqµtt :ill th~ event of an appeal. · · · ·. 
Ali- :either terms and conditions • remain, :unchiini;i:¢d.·. 
~c(o:tsement Effect1ve: 11/26/"06-
EI?,qors~ent· No~: 9 
--tiCCCOMP _000~5 
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CERTIPICATB OP NOTIFICATION 
t certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to _the 
following people for case 070916209 by the method and on the date 
s;pecified • 
MAIL: 
~: 
MAIL: . 
.n\MES T DUNN ups W S JORDAN PKWY STB AS JORDAN, UT 84095 · 
STBPHBN B ELGGREN 7390 S CRBE:lC RD #201 SANDY UT 84093-2031 
GARY L JOHNSON 299 S MAIN ST 15TH FLOOR SALT LA.KR CITY UT 
84U1 
MAIL: JUDSON T PITTS 45 W 10000 S # 211 SANDY UT 84070 MAIL: THOR B ROUNDY 6965 UNION PARK CNTR STE 0 180 MIDVALE 
84047-6019 
MAIL: CHAD T WARREN 3319 N UNIVERSITY AVE PROVO IJT 84604 
Date: l<l:Oct 4Qll 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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oa,031200103·:34 PMEndorsement 
NAMED INSURED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA: et.-al 
In: consideration of the preinium charg~, i_t •is ht;!~eby 1XQ.ders.t!0:od. 
~~ agreed that a Retroactive Date o.f; 11/Q.1/'o·s in lieu .of ·-s/0,1/01 
slla;U ~P.PlY to the following Named I.nsw:-_e4: 
.. 
P.RDDENT:OU. CRES COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATS 
Ail- other ·terms and- cdru,iitions remain unch~$~:-. 
10 
~ :E-53 
HCCCOMP _0003:46 
os,0312001 03:34 PM End O rs em en t 
NAMED .INSORED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA: ·et al 
rn-CoXls~deration of the premium charged it is he~eby unde:r:stood ~ 
a;gr¢ed: that Section IV. EXCLUSIONS .J.s aiq.eJ?.d~ tµ· µi~lude ~e 
fol.icwmg: 
This ·Policy does not apply to and the. Company ·shall not be liable £.or 
D~ges i31:ld/ or Claims Expenses rest;tlt.mg .f:rojQ. :an_y· ql~- Jqa~ -~g~~-t-· 
· :the :!:~~eq:: · 
::p.:~. ·tor,· _:}?a~fed ~on. or ar~ing from ~y: aj.~¢g~ •:unsotic-it;e4": ~~~g. 
~~~ ·µ,£~rma.,=i.oµ by fax, el~ctrenie! ~~±:~-. r~~~i:q. -;- -9'!= :~i~: @.Y' ~tj:i~.:c:· 
•~fHM~ wh,ere. -~~ohibited by law-. 
by: 
Bl'!l?· B-:-·174. 
-!.- HCCCOMP _000347 
os,0312001 oJ:34 PM End Or semen t 
~ 
N.AMED :tNSORED: UTAH COUNTY REA1, ESTATE, LLC DBA: et aJ. 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby. understood. 
and agreed that Section VI. LIM:[TS OP" LIABILITY i~ amended to 
inc1uae the fo11owing: 
f.) sup~lemental Payments 
TA1! .. ~ompany wi;I.l pay the reasonabl~ ~~$~$- in~ed, inclt\~g 
~tjt;:µ~:J_ a;a;m:: provabl~ loss of ~ag_es, if tbe. ,l,'.~~e4. is: reqq.ir.ed, ~y 
.tqi~_ C~y to attend proceeding.a. 0:1; ·tr,ial. i~. ~·.: c:ief~~ of a 
~W.et~~--·~laim. Such payments- are ~J~Q~ -~p ·-t:t;ie: ·j:q~ltjwi:1;1g: 
1·l ~he. maximum 1ZeimburseIW!llt .. for· such. :.e'XJ'iensea = ahal.1.-. not -,exceed-
::$_iso. :per day for· each I1isured who;.~atit~~: .. :~bli··.:p:rooeedl~gi;i it. 
.t:be .c·· . an • s . est • . . . . . 
·,, : ... ,,•-.-~ y reqtJ- •. . '• ... ·. . . 
~l -~~-- :Cpmpany_• s ~ tot~ 1:i,ab~~.t:1:;)'\:.f P;r: _,.;tt~b:ob~s~ent- :.aba].;L 
·. -~~J~ ~ce~d· $5., o,oo per Claims. regai;-41.t>.:~~:- o,f': ~~he·.: µ.um..b~ · ·0.t· 
· '.~~e~ ~h? at.tend s:uch ·proc~~qingJll;. ~t;:. -~~.'.·G.~;Y-• :S. 
-~~e.st ;- _cµul . . . . : . . 
· ::~): :~1\:'P:~r~:i~~~~~ b~ p~-t .<?f -~ i-~~~~,;~ _~#~µ.p~ --~~ ·:-~~~~~~-
. . 
:·.s.~i.ity· tgr _the purposes of this·: En4orsemen.\:.;- · 1~h~.- )).e4\\~.n>:!-¢. am:t,µJ;it 
~~P;.';JJ¢? ... JP7.~- ~9 ea~:µ c1~ ~~1 ~ot. ap~l~ ·:~9·· .. ~~:.,:su····-'p~i~.~ • 
~pa..~ep.:t:.s.. -~µ.e by the Company· under· :tpi:~ aub.s.~~-t~qi; --of ::1:;lJ:e . rob:~~ 
Aii·other terms· and conditions remain uncha.rigecl. 
Eµdors~~t Effective: 11/26/06 
.~clqr~e~t No.: 12 
--·-:- - HCCCOMP _000348 -
: : . 
oa,oa,2001 03:34 PME n d O r 5 em en t 
NAMED INSURED~ UTAlI COUNTY RRAu ESTME, LLC DBA: et al 
~-- ¢Qn~id,~.rat~on of the pr~ium• charged, it; i? J}er.~y- ·1.'lllqerst99(i 
·:and -~gJ:eed. that Section: II. "DEFiliITIONS .is amen.ded to in.ciude·- the· 
·fQl.~.QWµig:. . .. 
· i'l.l ·'J.'h~ ·1~wful. spous~ of an Insu:red (.~ set; ··fQ.rtl;L·: t:Di .i;t~ 1 --.4 
: · .-.. '· .. ~an~e) in· any Claims made against aucli: s·pouse · so~~~f by. reae~ 
- .. ·._·. · · =·~:f ~I?<'~-~ sbltU:s or_ ownership int~est: .1n_-~i~al." _·propert.y/. _ 
._-.:_·.'.: : 1~.$.s~:ts ~hat ·:ar·e -s.ought as 3:ecbv~ry-1 -~Q;·· $lic~ . -:c1itjtii-.,. l,ut: 9~Y.·· .. i:f 
-___ ·... -=~-~ .d¢ea no1;: al.leg~ a:rt,y w.rotig·fti.1 A"Gt. ;pr· ~!3.s.ipn: ·.b.¥.·.'.sµqJi · 
·- :_ .... ~·~~'9~~_:,,._ ., . . . 
.. _: .. · 
Ali othex- terms and conditions rem,ain un~hanged .. 
·tnd6i:"sement Effectl.ve: 11/'26/06 
• ';,,. _ _.•,~•!•"•••-•-:,I"•,\,', I • - • 
. '•, 
- ...: HCCCOMP _000349 
APPLICATION FQR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ERRORS & OMISSIONS INSURANCE 
IF COVERAGE IS ISSUED, JT WILL BE ON A-Cl.AJM$-N.M>E.BAf;J$• 
:NOTICE:''rf!IS INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVIDES THAT THE.UMtr OF'UABIUTY AVAlLABU: TO PAY 
.,. ~~~~~~:{~~=~~::,~~~~~~~i~~~~-ir.A~~~~~~~~ }P,t~~;81.~¢-~9~N'r.. . . -.. ·. . . .. . . . . . .. . . 
. . -: . . : . . . . .. . .. ✓~~ lf..4.~~-1/(.~ i!<-!/1:'b~ .. . . .. 
· .. · '1~:: ~,.~E~.(;)F.,Appµ~ UU« C<t!lfo/. &e/$#;L.~ ~~~(: !/-fl.~;,¢;,{-·~$?£'· ?/¢il:i~«~r:~ 
, l 
·t. ~;uMtrpf! LIABILITY DESIRED: 
:"C~i,~ . ··:pJ;QµpjJ~LE:.: 
;_,!t5~()· . :/ 
'• ,\JY!_.~ 
✓ 
$10.000 __ $25~000: : . · . ·. _. 
4.-· •pfease'describe in detail ·the pro.fessional advffles forwhlc:h coveta$e:b deslied: 
k-<,<l/fn/l,a,l'/%ae, H:le".c« ,",,./ /4eq/ &c<?i:9 .&-,?/~~~ 
:Other..,,_· -------
.S... ls.:tt1Erappl.fcant engaged In any business-or professlon other than as·cfescnbed trr ltem,4? 1:'q; 
.If )'~a>J.~~:attfjd)° an explanatlon and ~mat~ rev~n~ 
$'. ~-\tt~-~~I gross !Wenues for the past two years ~ed from t~o:se· ~~~ in Qu~on ·4~ in ~-ddffion. 
pl.~~11~ projected.revenJJes for the c:urr~ year .. 
__ .:......--..,...-~aai)r. ccium_·u~1t"Pffijecred 
b)'·U.05 
c)~ 
AMOUNT 
$/7.,~aa:t:> 
s 1'£,,/tq. B?Q 
s1~2.~~ 
Page 1 of 4 
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·"! .7. For 1,he revenues listed tn question 8a), pl~e give the approximate pen::eotage derived from each ol the 
activities listed in Question 4: 
Acm,nY 
/le'li@rl6'«1 
:~-- '.:aivi1icant1s:.:r____,..,tion. . 
·:~ ~-· ~..,,..,,~ .--
o/o OF 6a) REVENUES 
gz % 
/g ~ 
---°-' 
___ % 
'.·· · :,~- ·1s~.~P,~~~ ~ cootro~~.§Q¢a1ed.wRb.~~~rr,oc. ~•@•t~·. · ~ 
· s .• : ., ••. --::-:'•,..,...-i--:-'-~_~l"""'YES.:::;e::::NQ_· _.lfyes • .ettach an explanation. Art# ar:iy" a~~~;li~e4-li.i"Qu~.~- 4 .. P~~~d t9 sµ~ 
\ 
. ,: 
~=-.. 
-·· ;~o~~;-~a.spnse1·ves_· _No-L · · ·· ··· · ·· · · · · ···· · · · · · · ·· 
·. fari/4.~~I ~ ~ n'i«u.dJ 9~,ce_~; ~p ~i~✓- Z:..,ie. i>~H?. 1/~~~~ 
d!'··l·'•"ii,i Xi(;. · _ 
~1i. ·e) Nu.ml>ef --~f · principals, partneni\, officers and professional emr,IQ'Jees·:,dir~ en_gag~d in pr~rni 
se"rvit:es to dients: .Z'5'V 
b)· N_umber of non-professional employees (clerks, secretaries. etc.): __ .__ 2-_~_-______ _ 
).,?.;_ :~,~~8-.pn,v.1~:the followtng!: 
·.Name·-Jn fiJU·.of ALL. 
:Partoe~rtnc1pa1s1 
}~~~~~ 
Pa,rl: Cp/.f-,qJ 
t.,,,. 
PROFESSIONAL 
QUALIFICATIONS 
DA,:E 
Qt)AUAED. 
~2 
13. To what professlonal assoclation(s) does the Appficant Firm belong? 
tlrS:,.A Cou-dy ~/QPPn c,[k«fr?ts 
Page2ol 4 
·.fi<)W· µ)NG··lij 
_:"f?~qtl(?.~ 
-zel_""~Ht. 
. (/ r~A',4 
HOW.:LONG.AS 
.PAAlNER/' 
·pajNClP~ 
£~42$. 
HCCCOMP _Q00351 
.... 
;~~=-~-- , ... t • 
~ 14. Please Jnclude a fist of A,>plicant Firm's (Ne {5) largest Jobs t>r projects during the pastthn:le (~) years. Please 
give, in de!alt: t) proJectfdient name; 2) the nature of the servlces penonned for the cf'lant; and 3) the 
revenues obtained from those setvlces. . 
.. . t.edP·P:R l&.,n,v ,Zu.lv Rf4?P 
. 0fut". :R/fr,UOttleJI ~,....~•rl<tsf 
.. l?t!H?J,/;b,[4f!q 
• -·: .. -~z~-.,#4- tr~¥ #kw« 
• ·= .&~~ (e.,r,~ -Cc6:-i<:rt &~i'U: t.e.~ 
t"rzn. .,,,"-l<rl4 Bl{fc l3.-,PJ;r~ ✓li .. 751' 
&v~•< h,,,,,1 (o;oB?,@(! ~~ 
l!:,f'/;.1.,,._q'(.J! ,,,~ ea, . .1:t-P.rffP. 
LJ9ttHd<-r:,/af4-.,.,/ ... ?'c~~~-~~ . '9~ff:,> 
C~-tlef 'iwi __ -6,;-~--~ .'3n:totm 
1.~: . ;_•:~--!h~AJ?pli~t -~ :iise a w~en am~ct whh qient? 
=~-~-Jn.-:~1-~~ . __ somelf~ 
r.foa•Q·~--~ ~ tj)py-of your $bmdard contract(s). 
. . . 
=~·_ 17. ~:~,sl.r.nHar 1osuranc;e ever been dec;llned w cance.lled? Yes __iL_. (1(.y~. ~~ ~~~~O-) f'lo ..,._..;.-,. 
;rJ~P.?(k.tl :(:;,- t~s 4,~t#r':,, PF /;re/~~,,.5":F~ liP?..~~£'i:;:1~r ~?.;~/~~ 
·1:a. Js"similar:lnsurance·curren!ly-fn force? Yes _L_ No __ 
~f~,~~e provid~: 
D~_pt19n·a·servicas being-covered: .f.e9«tMto,/·OHt'( ~~ti:~(- ·l!W: -Fs(..,,/1¢ _ _. ... 
N..~~:-o1-1~~ ~tan ar:;,, ... ~-t?ori°'rr~j~- :· 
.. atio11 Date: _. ______ /...;;..'l"-_ZC-=-.. -°'~--~ Pr1or ActsJRavo.·Date: -. ..-. •.-r? ...... ·-4~~::;;.~L-,l __ . __ _ 
l:ii:n1t .s lt hOa, aoa Dedudibla: $ Z-5, &qo 
length of lfme coverage has been tn force: :Z !"-Mrlr 
-----.9.:-AUach most reGent 8tKfited fina, a.:iah;tatemems""(onec!nflai raturns)'ina.desaiptl\>11 bf_promoiionat mateiials. 
(~) Estimated Gross receipts for aimmt nsc:al period:$ /71 $Z3Prt>OO. 
(B) EstJma!ed.Cost of Goods Sdd for airrent·fisc;:al per1oo: $. /~, 100. ~ 
Page Sof 4 
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20. Have 8fr1 of th~ Individuals listed in ques1ion No. 12 evar beev1'e sub~ of a1Sdp!!J¥uy actlon by au1horities 
as· a res~ <;>f their professional acilvities? Vas __ No H yes. please explain. 
-~t~: f:1~.~=pa~. ~ be ·lnsuj-ed have knowledge or infonn~tion of~~ e~· ~r .. ~t--C?,~Jon ·.wt,lctl rn~f 
·-r.e~~·oe a~ed to give rise to a dalm agalnst hlmJher,; YES __:_No. · V·· ·:tt yes • .-ptease cornplele: · 
·.~:~~~me,n~ ClaJrh lnf~tion form for each. · · - · · ·· · 
:~. . .-~t:tnqi.!Jfy;·~iS'Ve .anY:clain'ls been madugalnst art{ proposed 1.nS.utecf(s). dtiifrj~f~-.:P.~:tht~13) ·~?. 
. 'J(~:- · -~. ·.==,:to~ lf·Y8Si please compl~t~ a ~ppemantal Pl~1MJof~l_Q9.f9m(I~ ~~;~~~ 
·~~Q'!:~··~rl)'-.c;l~s have.been made in the lasnhme (3) yeaJs.?: '$(·.;,f.#f:4£ie{ 42,frif.-&r<J:fl 
•~ ~.:9P#.'#Jil~~nd:~!Jl't!t!/H~t "!Ith respect "io questions 20,.21 sn~-#.AA"tJ;V!l,:1~t·'Jf~il..~·./91P-~tlfi .ar 
·lft..~~'Jlp.p_:~$._,e.Py:~Tm or..acµon atfslng ·therctram Is- excluded ·fmm._'111$;p_TXJP.O§?#qJ;•a9~·~- , ·· -· · '::- · 
.•... ··• = .. _ . ... ·, ..... :: ... ~· .•• ··-- . 
·~Qll.C,~ff:9i.~~{'(O~·~~~CANTS: ANY PERSON WHO ~~~l~ W,fnl:l~~~J~Ef.R:~"',g, 
Af.{Y.JN$µ~~E:CQMPANV OR·OTHER PERSON FILES AN APPUC.All.QN:FOl\~U~CE-C,ONTAINING: 
.AiftF.,r• ·1f ""'······•• .. ~ti .oR. · · c · FOR · · · . MJS··Ji.l,·Ji~, .. }~.~i1 .. i=.:f·"······:noN·.·· ... • .. =:···--···-·· 
, ... , ... : .... ~ .... ~RM.A11 N., ®.N EA.LS lllEPl)R~Of .... -~'~·,· f.'. .~.,:.• J~Qij~ 
ING_?Af;lY.;fACT:.MATERIAL llfE:hETO;. COMMITS A FRAUDULENT INSUAANC.E1Ac;i;:WttlCH]S.A:CRIME-. 
····::. .. . 
.. · .. 
~~~~-~-n.~~~~.1:>Y :~~~edges that he/she/It Is aware that tne llfn!l• ~.:·n.~,ty-~~tf.b~}~d~~,;~ ~: 
tia ~pletely."~ed;·by 1he costs of legal defense and. In such ewn~ the lnst.tter· shall not be-;6able ior:tha·. 
cos.ts o.f 1egal. defense or for the amount of any Judgemem·or- settlement to lhe extenUhafs"Ueh exceeds the.limit 
of ·.ilabllftY... . 
· ~ A.~lfc:arft.hereby. ftJJ.ther att<nowledges that he/she/it is aware that legal •defense costs that are incurrecl shall 
b ,;a ···nea·e .. •~:.th- 'deduetible am nt. . 
.e ...... i~~: .. i. ~. • ~ - . . OU 
I fHEB~Y.: Q~GtAFlE: ttif;lt,, s,ft~ r. in qt.dry. the above statements. an~ pa.,Uc.uJars:aie ·w<i'~r:f \ :h..w.e· 119t.suA>iessed' 
q.f~~·1eny-:riiatenai fad and that I agree that this appllcaUon shall .be ttnd:iiiSJs cMh.e contraci:Wittrttie·-
Q~.~1~~~ .. 
:• 
·•· t 
·~! .. ·. · .~ ;·.; · ~:.p.et,s9~.:·liutllon~ed to execute on behaJf ot the Appllcant 
.'.•.::.:>: ... ~·
1
.,-~ ·: ~ •. - . • Titte H-orl-llp,b': . · . ·pate _lo-·½,vcG 
·':: ... -· ·;,.-. 
:s:AppU~tiPifF.ontr duty completed, logether with any supplementary information; hn1St-ba..:.sig1ted in,Jrik tiy_tha· 
~rHndik:&t¢4 · · 
Signmg of.thls:fonn does not bind the Applicant or the UndeJWrit81"$ to complete the· tn·surance. 
THIS APPUCA110N MUST at; ~!.!BMIJJEJ m· 
PROFESSlONAL INDEMNITY AGENCY. INC_ 
PROFESSIONAL INDEMNITY AGENCY, INC. OF. N. Y. 
9 Rado Cln:le Drive· P.O. Box 5000 
Mount Kisco, New York 1054S.SOOO 
Attention: Edward D. Donnefty, CPCU 
Page 4 of 4 
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Sti'J1R'VWESf INSURAr!~ S-c".-~:~::....., 
3860 SOU1H 2300 EAST 
P.O. BOX 92~9· 
SALT"LAKE cnv, UT 84109-0289 
PHONE "If (8D1) 272·~68 
FAX~ (801) 277-3511 
HCCCOMP _000353 
. 
.. 
@ 
@ 
ADDENDUM ''C'' 
@ 
--
Settlement Agreement 
This Settlement Agreement (this "Agreemenf') is by and between William Compton, 
John Simcox and Saltair Investments, L.L.C. (collectively "Compton") and Ro~ert E. Seegmiller 
("Seegmiller''), effective this .:!!1.._ day of May, 2013. 
Recitals 
WHEREAS, Compton· has filed lawsuits against Seegmiller and rertain other defendants 
in Third District Court, State of Utah as Civil nos. 070916208 and 070916209 (the 'Litigation"); 
and 
WHEREAS, Compton and Seegmiller now wish to compromise and settle those claims 
and potential claims involving their respective interests in the Litigation for the consideration 
described herein; and 
WHEREAS, the parties anticipate that they may hereafter file additional claims against 
one or more third parties in order to fully resolve the matters addressed herein; 
NOW, THEREFORE, for the mutual consideration described herein, the sufficiency of 
which is hereby acknowledged, the parties do agree as follows: · 
Agreement 
l. A3 _consideration for the execution of this Agreement and the action described in 
· paiagrapb 2, below, Seegmiller agr~ to deliver consideration to Compton as follows: 
a. Seegmiller hereby assigns to Compton any and all claims Seegmil!er has or may 
have, of any nature whatsoever, 
(t) against the other defendants in the Litigation, 
(2) against any insurance carrier, including without limitation the policies 
maintained by Utah County Real Estate, ILC dba Prudential Utah ReaJ Estate during 
all times relevant to the Litigation and thereafter (the ~olicy Claims"), and 
(3) against Dan McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen, PU.C with respect to all 
matters arising out of their representation of Seegmiller in the Litigation (the 
~cDonald Claims',) 
(alt as~igned claims being collectively referred to as the "Seegmiller Claims"). 
b. Seegmiller shall assist plaintiffs in the prosecution of the Seegmiller Claims by 
providing all reasonably requested assistance, including without limitation: 
(1) meeting with Thor Roundy as counsel for Compton to discuss the facts, 
providing a deposition if required by the defendants, testifying at trial if the case goes 
to trial, signing an affidavit to support a motion that is made before trial, in addition 
to providing all reasonably requested information to counscl for Compton that would 
l 
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be useful to the prosecution of the Seegmiller Claims, including without limitation 
disclosing in writing and/or recorded format to counsel for Compton all attorney-
client communications between Dan McDonald and other attorneys associated with 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC during the course of the Litigation, and all factual 
information that would assist Compton in pursuing the Litgation against the other 
defendants; 
(2) providing truthful and complete deposition testimony, consistent with the 
information provided to counsel for Compton pwusant to subparagraph 1.b.(1), 
including without limitation concerning all attorney-client communications between 
Dan McDonald and other attorneys associated with Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC during 
the course of the Litigation; 
(3) appearing and testifying at trial if needed in pursuit of the Seegmiller Clai~ 
including without limitation concerning all attorney-client communications between 
Dan McDonald and other attorneys associated with Smith Hartvigsen, PU.C during 
the course of the Litigation and other questions asked at trial; and 
( 4) signing any reasonable document as may be necessary to assist Compton in 
pursuing, compromising, settling, or otherwise benefitting from the Seegmiller 
Claims, including without limi~tion further documents evidencing the assignment of 
the Seegmiller Claims, affidavits that may be used in prosecuting any of the 
Seegmiller Claims, any settlement to whicli Seegmiller' s signature is reasonably 
requested, and so forth. 
c. Within 30 days after the execution _of this Agreement, Seegmiller shall fully disclose 
to Compton, including without limitation providing copies of documents in his 
possessio_n or control or which may be obtained by him, the terms upon which the 
loan originally made by ANB Financial to Timpanogos Ranchettes, LLC (the 
"Timpanogos Loann) was assign~ transferred or otherwise addressed to parties 
other than ANB Financial; and Seegmiller shall sign or caused to be signed any and 
all documents reasonably necessary to ensure than the assignees of the Timpanogos 
Loan have fully and completely released Compton with respect thereto. Seegmiller 
shall indemnify and bold harmless Compton with respect to any and all claims arising 
from the Timpanogos Loan, including witout limitation with respect to any personal 
guarantee signed by William Compt~n or John Simcox. 
d. Seegmiller will release to Compton any additional documents and information 
concerning the defendants in the Litigation that will assist Compton in pursuit of its 
claims against the other defendants. Said information shall be provided by 
Seegmiller pursuant to subparagraph 1.b., above. With r~pect to the McDonald 
Claims, Seegmiller further represents and warrants to Comption that the met alleged 
in the draft complaint against Dan McDonald and· his law firm Smith Hartvigsen, 
Pl.LC (attached hereto as Exhibit" A") are true to the best of Seegmiller's knowledge; 
and that Seegmiller had not provided any release or made any othe.r compromise or 
waiver of any of such claims. 
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2. The parties agree that for participation and by signing this Agreement shal 1 result in 
the complete and full release of Seegmiller with respect to the Litigation. During this process, 
Compton agrees that: 
a. Compton shall not contact Seegmiller' s employer, except as instructed by Seegmiller 
to confirm that the parties have resolved the claims against Seegmiller in the Litigation; 
and 
b. Compton shall not take any action to garnish or attach any asset or income of 
Seegmiller. 
3. Compton and Seegmiller agree that it is their preference, subject to the requirements 
of any Court that may affect how claims are managed, to pursue the Seegmiller Claims in the 
following order: 
a. the McDona1d Claims; 
b. potential summary judgments against Surety Title, Jerry Schlife, Gary Maxwell and 
his companies, John Ogden and his companie~ and Century Tit]e; 
c. the Policy claims; and_ then 
d. all remaining claims in the Litigation. 
4. Compton shaU pursue the Seegmiller Claims in the name(s) of Compton as the owner 
and/or assignee of such claims, except when required by a Court to identify Seegmiller in some 
fashion. 
5. The parties recognim that Seegmiller has paid approximately $70,000 in attorney's 
fees to third parties as a result of the Litigation. The parties agree that Seegmiller will be 
reimbursed with respect to said attomey,s fees to the extent that the amount recovered by 
Compton with respect to the assignment of the Seegmiller Claims exceeds $750,000. For 
purposes of this paragraph, the amount recovered by. Compton is the amount actually received by 
Compton, after payment of expenses incurred by Compto11:. including costs and attorneys fees. 
6. By Seegmiller providing the cooperation necessary to successfully pursue the 
Seegmiller Claims, then Compton shall dismiss the Litigation with respect to Seegmiller and the 
pursuit of the claims described herein. If Compton fails to recover all of its damages as a result 
of a ruling of law by a judge or an error by legal counsel for Compto~ Seegmiller sha11 not 
thereby forfeit his right to the dismissal of the Litigation. Subject to the full petformance of the 
covenants set forth herein, the parties agree that this Agreement shall constitute a mublal release 
by both parties of all claims, known and unkno~ liquidated or contingent, in co~ tort or 
otherwise, as between Compton and Seegmiller. 
7. This agreement is solely for the benefit of the parties hereto and not any third party, 
including without limitation the parties who are subject of the assignment of the Seegmiller 
Claims. 
3 
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8. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Agreement. Performance 
that references a date shaJI be absolutely required by midnight Mountain Standard Time on the 
stated date. 
9. Seegmiller agrees that he shall not file for bankruptcy while the claims anticipated by. 
this agreement are pending and for a period of not less than 90 days following the delivery of the 
full consideration anticipated by section I, above, and that Seegmiller shall take all other and 
further action necessary to ensure that the transfer of such consideration is complete and non-
reversible under any circumstances. 
IO. Any notice required or permitted by this Agreement may be delivered directly to the 
designated party or to the attorney for the party. Notice may be delivered by registered or 
certified U.S. mail to the current residence of the party, in which case a return receipt shall be 
deemed proof of delivery. Notice may be delivered by regular U.S. mail, by facsimile or by · 
email to counsel for a party, in which case counsel shall provide written confirmation of receipt 
using the same method of delivery. 
11. This Agreement shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State ofU~ 
and any action to enforce this Agreement shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction 
within the State ofUtah. 
12. The failure by any party to enforce any provision of this Agreement shall not be 
deemed to be in any way construed as a waiver of this Agreement or any provision hereof, nor 
shall such failure prevent such party from enforcing each and every provision of this Agreement 
thereafter. 
13. This Agreement, together with the documents referenced here~ constitutes the 
·.complete agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. This 
Agreement cannot be modified except by a written agreement signed by all of the parties hereto. 
14. This Agreement may be executed in two or more counterparts, which taken together 
shall constitute one and the same agreement. 
15. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, in consideration of the 
cooperation given to Compton by Seegmiller, Compton hereby waive5» releases, fozgives and 
discharges any and a:11 claims, demands, damag~, expenses, costs, losses, liabilities, and causes 
of action that Compton has or may have against SeegmilJer:, including all of their respective 
employees, membei;s, managers, officers, shareholders, directois, trustees, beneficiaries, 
successors, subsidiaries, affiliatCS:, assigns, heU"S:, representatives and agents that in any way arise 
out of or are related to any prior dealings between the parties (the 'itelease"'). All action and 
documents necessary to complete the Release will be completed and filed as soon as it is no 
longer necessary to preserve the underlying claims to satisfy the damages element of the 
Seegmiller Claims, as assigned pursuant to section I of this Agreement. 
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16. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Compton does hereby agree to defend and 
indemnify Seegmiller, including all of their respective employees, members, managers, officers, 
shareholders, directors, trustees, beneficiaries, successors, subsidiari~ affiliat~ assigns, heirs, 
representatives and agents, and save them hannless from and against all claims, causes of action, 
loss, damag~ liability or expense, including expense of litigation., arising out of: resulting from 
or in any way related to the parties' prior dealings with regard to Seegmiller that are hereafter 
filed as a result of this Agreement. 
In Witness whereat: the Parties have executed this Agreement below. 
~-~·~ 
obertE.Seegmiller 
5 
John Simcox 
William Compton 
Saltair Investments, LLC 
John Simcox, member/manager 
~ 
I 
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filed as a result of this Agreement 
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16. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Compton does h eby agree to defend and 
indemnify Seegmiller, including all of their respective employees, bers, numagers, officers, 
shareholders, directors, trustees, beneficiaries, successo~ su • · · a:flili~ assigns, heirs, 
representatives and agents, and save them:harmless from and ag · all claims, causes of action, 
loss, damage, liability or ~e, including expense of litigation, sing out of, resulting from 
or in any way related to the parties"' prior dealings with regard to S ·11er that are hereafter 
filed as a result of this Agreement · 
Robert E. Seegmiller 
Saltair Jnv·estcn<tnts., LLC 
John Simco~ ember/manager 
5 
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Thor Roundy (Bar No. 6435) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
6965 Union Park Center, Suite 180 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Facsimile (801) 364-4721 
IN THE TIIlRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM COMPTON, and JOHN 
Sll\4COX, individuals, and SALTAIR 
INVESTMENTS, LL.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, · 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
DANIEL J. MCDONALD=- an individual, 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company, and 
JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
(Jury Demanded) 
Civil No. 
Judge 
Plaintiffs complain against defendants and for causes of action alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. The jurisdiction of this Court is properly invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-5-102(1) (2010, as amended). 
7 
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2. Venue is properly laid in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78B-3-307 
(2008, as amended). 
PARTIES 
3. Plaintiff William Compton is an individual residing in Washington County, State 
ofUtah. 
4. Plaintiff John Simcox is an individual residi_ng in the State of Colorado. 
5. Plaintiff Saltair Investments is a Utah limited liability company with its principle 
place ofbusiness located in Washington County, State ofUtah. 
6. Defendant Daniel J. McDonald is an individual residing in Utah County, State of 
Utah. 
7. Defendant Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC (the "Law Firm") is a Utah professional' 
limited liability company with its principle place of business located in Salt Lake County, State 
of'Utah. 
8. Defendant John Does 1 through 10 are individuals and entities whose identities 
and/or actions are not now sufficiently known, but whose identities and actions shall be alleged 
hereafter. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
9. On or about November 14, 2007, plaintiffs filed claims against Robert E. 
Seegmiller ("Seegmiller") and Utah County R~l Estate, L.L.C. dba Prudential Utah Real Estate 
('Prudential,,) in Third District Court for the State ofUtah as Civil nos. 070916208 and 
070916209 {the "Litigation"). 
8 
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interest in not reporting the Litigation to the Policy carrier in order to avoid an increase in future 
premiums and/or other impacts on the ability of Prudential to maintain professional liability 
insurance. 
13. As a party named in the Litigation that did not have responsibility to pay the 
premiums or otherwise maintain the Policy, Seegmiller did not have the same ·incentive to fail to 
report the Litigation. to the Policy carrier. 
14. McDonald failed to disclose to Seegmiller that the-failure to immediately report 
the Litigation pursuant to the requirements of the Policy might result in a loss of insurance 
coverage to Seegmiller _with respect to the Litigation. 
15. McDonald should have reasonably foreseen that the Litigation might result in a 
judgment for negligence being render_ed as against Seegmiller and that Seegmiller would 
otherwise incur thousands of dollars in legal fees defending against the Litigation. 
16. McDonald failed to disclose to Seegmiller that a conflict ofinterest existed with 
respect to his representation of both Seegmiller and Prudential in the Litigation . 
9 
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17. McDonald failed to obtain any written consent or other waiver from Seegmiller 
with respect to the conflict of interest that existed with respect to his representation of both 
Seegmiller and Prudential in the Litigation. 
. 18. On or about June 6, 2012, Plaintiffs ~btained a judgment for professional 
negligence against Seegmiller in the Litigation in the amount of$1,041,275.34. 
19. The canier of the Policy denied coverage under the terms· of the Policy, as a result 
of the failure of Seegmiller and Prudential to timely report the Litigati~n pursuant to the 
requirements of the policy. 
20. On or about April 8, 2013, in order to stop collection of the judgement and other 
further pursuit of the Litigation, Seegmiller assigned his claims against McDonald and the Law 
Firm to plaintiffs. 
above. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
21. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein paragraphs I through 20, 
22. McDonald owed a dufy of care to Seegmiller, including without limitation (1) to 
advise Seegmiller as to the consequences of his failure to timely report the Litigation to the 
Policy carrier, and (2). to obtain an informed written consent from Seegmiller with respect to the 
conflict of interest involved in McDonald's representation of both Seegmiller and Prudential. 
23. McDonald ·breached its duty of care to Seegmiller by failing (1) to advise 
Seegmiller as to the consequences of his failure to timely report the Litigation to the Policy 
carrier, and (2) to obtain an informed written consent from Seegmiller with respect to the conflict 
of interest involved in McDonald's representation ofboth Seegmiller and Prudential. 
10 
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24. -As a ·proximate result of the breach of the duty of care by McDonald, Seegmiller 
lost insurance coverage under the Policy for the judgment obtained against him and the other 
pending claims in the Litigation and Seegmiller has incurred thousands of dollars in costs and 
attorneys fees in litigation with third parties. 
25. As a result of the negligence of defendants,· plaintiffs as the assignees of 
Seegmiller:, s claims are entitled to damages in an amount to be determined at trial, consisting of 
the judgment for $1:,041~75.34 referenced abovel' interest accruing on said judgmen~ any · 
additional and further judgments issued in the Litigation, attorneys fees incurred by Seegmiller in 
litigation with plaintiffs as thir-d parties, and costs incurred in this action. 
JURYDEMAND 
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial of the foregoing causes of action and hereby tender jury 
fees. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that pursuant to the foregoing Complaint that they be 
awarded damages against defendants, in an amount to be proven at trial; prejudgment and post-
judgment interest; costs incurred ·herein; and for such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this __ day ofMay:, 2013. 
11 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
@ 
® 
ADDENDUM ''D'' 
• 
-
.. -~· ... 
· fllD IIITlltT CIURT 
"(hlrd Judicial District 
OCT 18 2011 
.. , Atll-
b.pur,cllll1'. 
IN 11-IE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT. SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STAlE.OF UlAH 
WILIJAM·QOMPJON. JOHN SIMCOX. 
an.d SALT AIR JN\IESTMENTS, LLC, 
Pli:tbififfs, 
vs. 
ROBERT SEEGMJLLER, STERLING 
SARNES. UTAH COUNTY REAL 
ESTATE, LLC dba.PRUDENTIAl. UTAH 
R1=AL ~A~ VALLEYVIEW 
EST.Al'E~. LLCy SOR~ Till.E 
· AGENCY, .and JOHN DOES 1-20, 
Defenclanb. 
MaAORANDUM DECISION 
AND.ORDER 
Case No.- 070916209 
Judge Kate A. Tootnei)l . 
This matter is before the Court ·an the following. motions: (1) Plaintiffs Motion for 
ParttalStJmrnaJ)' judgment Concerning Robert E. S~g:miller, filed May 9, 2011: (2) Robert 
-Se:et)millet's ~ll>Ss Motion for Partial S~ry Judgment_ filed Mar i3, 2011; (3)Robert 
st:leQmiller:s Mot;ion to -Strik·e. filed May 13, 2011; (4) Robert Seegrnillers Motfbn -to 
' 
.Amend, filed August~ 1, 2011; (5) Plaintiffs' Motton for Summai:y Judgment Concerning 
VaUeyView Estates~ LLC and sterling Barnes, filed Apn128, 2011; and {6) Sterfing BaJ!les 
adid Valley View Estiites, Ll.,C"s Motion for SijmmaJY J~gment, filed Apn113, .Z011. The 
motions were fulfy briefed,· and oral arguments wer':' held on A~gust:26 ,and August 29, 
-------------------------------------~ 
--
r 
2~11. The motions are now ready for decision. 1 
BACKGROUND 
In t,1arch2006. Plaintiffs William Compton and John Simcox met Defendant Robert 
SeegmiUer. a real estate agent working for Prudential Utah Real Estate. The parties 
di5tussed their col'hmon Interest in developing commercial land. Mr. Seegmiller showed 
. . 
the Plalnttffs various properties for prospective purchase. provided them with information 
about comparable sales.· assisted with negotiatiQns to purchase pmperty. ~d drafted 
documents on the Plaintiffs' behalf. 
On September 21. 2006, Mr. Seegmtllerldentified a promising parcel of real esta~ 
1h Herriman. utah. On December 26. the Plaintitfs comp·any Sattair Investments, LLC. 
~~red into a real estate purchase con~ct ("R~PCj to buy the propertyfror,:i Def~ndant 
Valley View Estates, LLC. The REPC requ1red that SaJtair deposit $705,000 in eamest 
ml)ney fO(' the pQtehtial purchase of the lots. On Novemb~r 29. 2DO!J aod January 4 and 
10, 2007, the P(aintiffs deposited the earnest money into an escrow account with Surety 
Trtle Agency, p.er the te.rms of the REPC. The REPC provided that the earnest money 
~Uld become non-retundable once the plat was recorded. 
The REPC, Addendum 1, provides: 
~ The Buyer wiJI secure their specific lots or priori~)' position with a 
paid reservation deposit fn the aroount of FIFTEEN llf OUSAND dollars 
($15.D00.) per lot by making a check or wire transfer payable-to the 
Sellers TrtJe Company. Onte the plat is recorded this money wm 
become non-refundable to the buyers. . 
3. As SQotl as the Lots are recorded 1he Buyer wiU be notified. No later 
than ~r\ days after notification of re~ a~on of the finaJ plat. each 
' Mr. Barnes and Valley View filed a Motion to strike Affidavit of Thor Roundy. 
The motion has not bE!e!l submitted for declsk?n and will net be addressed. · 
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reseivation deposit will be converted to eamest money and this Real 
Estafe Purchase Contract will rep~ the reseivatfon held on each lol 
This pu·rchase contract and addendum will identify the specific price 
and settl~ment date. lhe Buyer will be notified by certified mail of the 
recordalion of the plal . 
4. Buyer will close en all lots identified below thirty (30) days after any 
cidjustments per a~eme~ and bulding permits can be issued by the 
city. . 
On January 10, 2007, Defendant sternng Ba mes and Brett Redd,2 owners of Land 
DE!Velopment Al&ance· C-LDA1, purchased the Herriman property for $7,45B,500. 
Defendant ValleyVfew Estates, also owned by Mr. Bames and Mr. Redd, then purchased 
ths property from LOA 'for $12,886,500. LDA ·Ioanecr $5,609, 162 to Vall~ View to pay . 
the dc¥09 costs •. In fact, it was the Plaintiffs~ escrow money that was deposited wm, th& 
scime il'lstitUlion (Defendant Surety Title Agency) that was us-ed to pay the closing costs.· 
Meanwhile.ANS Financial NA. agreed to loan Valley View over$16 million. Of that 
mtiney, $7 millJon was ~eposHed with SuretyTitle Group for the purchase of-the property, 
. Land Development AIDance got $1.5 million, and Mt. Seegmmer and two other men got 
$304,000 to share. 
Valley View taned to develop the property pursuant to the tenns promised by Mr. 
· Barnes, and the Plaintiffs attempted to eXetcfse their right to cancel the REPC and foreg9 
pur~ng the lots. However, surety could not relwn the eam~ m~ney becau~ It had 
released the money to.Valley View upon Sterling Barnes's request. 
The f'fainliffs have broug~t causes of action against Mr •. Seegmmet and Prudential. 
for accounting. breach of fiduciary duty, negfigence, fraUd, negrigent (Jlisrepresentation. 
and conspiracy. Against Mr. Bames and Valley View, thEt Plaintiffs bring claim~ for· 
.2 Mr. Redd is not a party to this action. 
3 
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ac;:counting, tfleft. fraud, .and conspiracy. 
DISCUSSION 
There arefourmotkms for summary judgment before the Court. The Piaf miffs move 
for· partiaJ summary Judgment agaJnst Mr. Seegmiller and Prudential on their claims for 
b~acb offiduc.iaJY duty and negfig~ce. Mr. Seegmmer and Prudential filed a cross-motion 
fat _summary judgment The ~laintiffs also move for summary judgment on a~ dams 
against Mr. Barnes and Valley Vie:N. Mr. Barnes and Valle:I View filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment 
Swn~ry ju~gnient "shall be rendered if the pleadings.. depositions, answeGJ to 
in1er,ogatorl~ and :m~ions on file, together~ the-affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issutt as ld any material fact _and that the moving p~ i~ entitled to judgment 
~ a matter of law." Utah R. Clv. P. 56{c). "A triaJ court ls not authorized to weigh facts fn 
deciding a summary Judgment .motlon, but is only ta determine whether a dlspute of 
material f~_exists, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom 
in·alightmostfaYorabletothe nonmoving party." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete CoU(Jty, 
2002 UT 17. 1f -44. 42 P.-3d 379 ( ~~on omitted). ,. A genuine issue of fact exists where, 
on the basls of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ' on any material 
'issue." Ron Shepherd Jns. Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 6:55 {Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). 
Mr, SeeamlUet's Motion for Leave to Amend . 
Mr. Seegmlller moves the Court for leave to amend his Memorandum in Opposition 
to fJaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgme~t and Cross Motlon fot summary Judgment He 
4 
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oppose the motion, and the Court GRANTS the motion. 
Mr. SeagmiUer's Motion to Strike 
Mr. Seegmiller moves the Court to strike certain paragraphs of the Affidavit of John 
Simcox filed in support of Plainuffs Motion fa- Partial Summary Judgment Mr. Simcox 
testified as to what Mr. Seegmiller said to co-Plaihtiff Mr. Compton. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules 
of Civtt Procedure, requires afflClavits to be made on personal knowledge. Mr. Simcox 
does not have personal knowledge of the intentions and actions of his co-plaintiff, and the 
Court GRANTS the motion as lo paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 16, 20, 21, 22. 23, 24, 25, 26 of Mr. 
Simcox's affidavit 
Claim~ agaln;st Mr. Seegmiller and Prudential 
The Pl~inliffs claim that between March 15, 2008 through early 2007, Mr Seegmiller 
ac~ as their real estate agent ahd thus owed them certain_ fiduciary duties. They also 
3rgl.le that even if Mr. Seegm1llerW1ls.not.acllng as their agent, he nevertheless breached 
comtnon law duties owed to them. 
Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Real estate agents owe fiduciary duties lo their clients, including the duties of 
dillgerice, loyalty, full disclosure, honesty, care, and good faith. See, a.g., Hopkins v. 
Ward/&yCorp., 611 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Utah 1982). The Utah Administrative Code provides 
that an agent owes, inter afia, the following dutie~: protect and pi:omote the interests. cl the 
cli~I ahead of oneself, loyally, full disclosure of material lnformatlon, and reasonable care 
5 
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aod diligence_. The agent must provide a written agency agreement defining the scope of 
··representation. utaJiAdmin. Code Rule 162. 
The Plaintiffs argue that they ber,eved Mr. Seegmiller was acting as their real estate 
agent during the process of the Herriman property purchase, and they put their trust in him. 
They claim th.at he breached an agent"s fiduciary duties to his _principals. For example, 
they cite that. he pf aced his own Interest ahead of theirs_ when ha accepted a fee from 
V$118}'VJeW; h-~.did nQt provide J:ilsd.osure of material informatlon, especially details of the 
"fllp" sale; he failed to conduct due diligence on Valrey View's financial status; he failed to 
provide a writte"n agency agreement or disclose in Wtffing the scope of his representation; 
h~ falled to draft the REPC in a marmer that prohibited Mr. Barnes and. VaUeyView from 
u~ng the earnest ~oneythe Plaintiffs had depqsitedwith Surety; he faffed to Jnciude ~nils 
ih the REPC for the return of the earnest mooey; and he failed lo supply Surety with a copy. 
of 1he REPC arid Ifs esCfOw lnstrucUons. 
Before the Court,;anconsldetthe Breach of fiduciary duty claims, It must detemune 
.whether Mr. Seegmllierwas acting as ret;1! estate agent for Mr. Compton and Mr. $imcox. 
If Mr. Seegmffler was not their agent. _he does not owe the-_Plalntiffs the same duties a 
fidiJciary owes a oUenl. Toe Utah Court ·of Appeals explains •agency:,. 
The key relationship between a real estate broker al1d a client is 
agency, and the umversc11 laws applying lo prihcipals and agents 
conttcl their right~ and responsibUities. Agency is lhe fiduciary 
JBlationwhlch resuJts from the manifestation of consent by one person 
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
contl'QI. and .consent by the other so to act. Thus, for Welsh to show 
Wardfey was his aQehf. he must prove that (1J he manifested that 
Wardley COUid act for him; (2) Wardley accepted the proposed 
un~ng, and {3) both Welsh and Wardley understood that Welsh 
was to be In charge of the undertaking. In other woofs, an agency is 
aeated and authority ls actually a>nferred very much as a contract is 
6 
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made; a meeJing of the minds must exist between llie parties. 
Mp~ver, aod t;.ftical in this case, (aJn agency ~latJonship can arise 
.only :at tfja will and. by the act of the principal. . 
Waidlay Corp. v. Welsh. 962 P.2d 86, 89 {Utah Ct App. ·1998) (intemaJ quotcitio0$-.and 
-citations 0mJUed). 
The .Court first cohsiders the evidence submitted by the "Plaintiffs in favorof finding 
l 
~ age_n.cy ,:elatlo.~hip. ·Toe Plaintiffs claim tnat Mr. SeegmHJ~r ·•represented his 
credentials to ptaintiffs and told plaintiffs that he. would represent them -as a buyer's real 
: . . . 
e$talb ~92nt • .Ha showed potential invesbnent ·properties to. the Plaintiffs an~ provided 
~m with sales dc4ta and Mµltltlie USting Service (•MLS') info: Mr. S~gmil!er drafteci the 
RERC for purchase of tha Heniman property on behalf ~f the Plaintiffs, and he did not 
ol)jectwhep ant>1her parly'fj!Jed in his pame a'S the boye(~ agenl 
The Cowblso (»nsklers Mr. S~miUer's arguments against findfng that ha was 
-actting mi a reaJ'esmte agent for the Plaintiffs. Mr. Seegmillt:!r detjl~s ltrat ha ¢ver told the 
. ·. . 
P~fntifrs be wou)d repr.esent them in artt capacity; he ~enles filllng In his riame on the 
. ~ 
"Rf:PC as the Pl~iotiffs agent; and he argues that he was n:,erely tontn1>uting hi~ expertise 
a~ a member of a group of lriyestors. He raises the issue Jhat the "broker"· fleJd rn the 
R~c: wa-s left blankt where normally he would Write in Prud~ntial; without the backl~ of 
Prudential, tte dai_ms ·that he could n~t legally represent Plaintiffs as their agenl Mr. 
8e-egmiUer did pot pIPvide any sort _of_ agency cpn~ct to the Plai~tiffs nor did he make-
' . 
mention of any a-pent-d"ient relationship •. He a~edges tliat ha drafted the Ra>c 
• # • • • 
requarioo-PJainUJf s eamest money to be deposited with-Surety but claims.that the Plaintiffs 
. . . 
nragotiated 1ha ~nt · of ea~t money with Mr. Barnes.. and Mr. Seegmllrer only 
fotmafized the agreement 
7 
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The Court cpncfucles that issUes of fad remain whether Mr. Seegmiller was acting 
as the Plaintiff's real estate agent Both parties submitted an expert affidavit The 
Plaintiffs" expert concluded that Mr. Seegmiller was acting a;i the Plaintiffs' agen~ and Mr. 
SeegmHler's expert opined that he was not. There iS evidence supporting each position, 
and on seVeral contentions the parlies plainly disag(ee as to the facts. This issue Is 
therefore resEWJ.ed for tbe jory .as. the mer of fact. 
Claim ~r Neg/lgenca 
Even if a -re~ esta~ agent IS not acting i,:i the capacity of a~ent tor another party, 
ho still rmes certain duties to all parties to any transaction in which he is involved. Dugan 
v. Jones, 815 P 2d 1239, 1248 (utah 1980). Under the Utah Administrative Code Section 
1$2-~ an agent in~Jved in a transac6on must disclose in writing his agency r~ationshlps. 
He must dJsclose in writing to an parties to the transaction any compensation he wm 
racelve. 
The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Seegmiller breached his common law duties toward 
them, including: faifmg t.o adVise them to consult an attorney; failing to ·draft necessary 
tenns in the R~C; failing to deflver a copy of the REPC ~ Surety; maintaining and hicfmg 
a . cooffl~ of interest (by receiving money from Valley Yiew); failing to obtali) escrow 
instructions. failing to disclose in writing his agency relationships or any fees he might 
collect; and concealing Uie fact that Valley View planned to remove the esc19W money to 
finance the purchase. 
The Plaintiffs clafm that Mr. Seegmiller's failure to dlsclose material information 
a:tused thetn to rely on his a~~ a·nc1 deposlt a large sum of money Into the escrow 
account. wh~ was then taken and used by Valley Vlew. The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. 
8 
-Seegmiller breached his duties to the Plaintiffs, thus causing them harm. 
Mr. SeegmlU~ argues that the breach of fiduciary duty and negligence clatms are 
hatred by the economic loss rule. The economic loss rule bars tort recovery for contract 
cfpirns. Where a conbact exists. recovery is funited lo the tenns of that contract. .SME 
Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,Stalnback & As.socs •• Inc., 2001 UT 54, n 30, 28 P .3d 
6$9. Mr. Se~Iller argues that the Plaintiffs' claJms are based on a theory that there was 
a quask:ontract between ·Mr. seegmOJer and tbe Plaintiffs, and th·erefote lhe Plaintiffs are 
~rred from bringing any tort claim outside the. contract. 3 
Theeconomlc loss rul_e.d<>fjSS n-pt bat tort ~I~ based upon duties i~epentfent·of 
. those found in a contract. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, 1J 51, 70 P.3d 1. 
Whe.n an independent duty exists. the rule does not bar tort claims based on a duty of 
care. Hermanse11 v. TasuDs, 2002 UT 52, ,r 15, 48 P.3d 235 (holdjng that real estate 
. . 
bltlkers oWe a duty to prospeatve buyers to disclose material facts about the property). 
The Court con.eludes- that regardless of whether Mr. Seegmiller was acting as the 
~I estate agent for Plalntiffs for the purpose of purchasing the Herriman !ots. he owed 
certaln duties to the Plaintiffs, whJch he breached by faning lo clarify hls role in the 
transaction, ahd failing to disclose a person~ interest in the transaction. 
J Under the economic loss iula, a duty is owed only to the parties to ~ contract. . 
=tlle "implled duly to use reasonable and customary care In the provision of professional 
s$Vices ~g from contract is owed only to the person or entity for whom the 
professional servfces are to be renqered: SME Indus.. Inc. v. Thompson. Ventulett. 
S#alnbsck & Assocs., Int:., 2001 tJT 54, f 30, 28 P.3d 669. The •economic loss ru1e• 
prt>Vfd~ thal one may not recover "economic" damages for a non-lntenUonaJ tort. 
Ec:onomlc loss is defin.ed as: "Oamagl!S for Inadequate value, costs of repair and 
replacement of the defective product. or consequent loss of profits -without any claim 
of.personal Jnju,y or damage to other property." Am. Towers Owners Assn v. CCI 
Mech .• 930 P .2d 1182, 1189 (citation omitted). · 
9 
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Mr. Seegrhiller, In h~ Motfon for Sumrnary Judgment. argues that he is not 
peJSonaJly ftabJa for the alleged bad acts _because Prudential is liable for the acts of its 
agentsWithintho.scope.ofemploymentauthority. See. Hodgasv. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 
P 2d 151, 156-(Utah 1991) (an agent actiJ)g on behalf of broker is not fiable for torts unless 
hEt in~ded to be personalJy Dable).. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a 
supe,vJsor may be IJable ·aJC?Og with the .agent Prudential's po1ential Rabinty does not 
fofeclose.Mr .. Seegmiller's Joint Hability. An agent may be held Hable for his own tats. 
Brtldy K Roosevelt SS Ca., 317 U.S. 5l5, 580. 
Frx the foregoing reason.s. the Comt DENIES tha Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Sutnm,uy Juc:twnent on the breach of fiduciary duty claim and GRANTS summary 
jucfpment on )he claim for negftgence. 
ClalRJ! against Sb!rtlng Barnes and Valley Y]ew Estate 
The Plaintiffs and Sterling Sames an<t Valley View have filed cross.moUons for 
. . 
surhmaiy Judgment nn the cl~s for theft, fraud, nagilgent misrepresentation, and 
.conspjra:cy. 
' iha REPC, Addendum ~ diswsses the Plaintiffs' earnest money: 
2. The BUyer wllJ secure their specific Lots or-priority posltion with a 
pa!d re.servatlon deposit in the amount of AFTEENTHOUSAND dollars 
($15,000) per lot by maklng a check or wire ttaz,.sfer payable to the 
seJJers 1lt1e Company. Once the plat is recorded th1s money wm 
becom~ non-refundable to the buyers, 
3~ As-soon as the Lots are recotded the Buyer will be notified. No later 
than ten days .after notification of TeCOrdation of the final plat, each 
reservat)c)n deposlJ wm oe converted to earnest money and thJs Real 
Estate P1:1rchase Contract wiU replace the reservation held nn each lot. 
Tbfs purtha. contract-and addendum will 1dentify the specmc -price 
and -seftl~ent date. The Buyer wtU be notified by certffied mall of the 
10 
-recordation of the plat . 
4. Buyer wffl dose on all lots identified b~low thirty (30) days after any 
adj~ pet agreement-and bulkfing permits can be issued by1he 
city. 
(~hasfs add~.) 
Th~ platwas not recorded 1.Jnb1 March 6, 2007, h!11 Mr. Barnes caused the esaow 
tmnayto be rempv-ed-~m the account on JanUS"~ 1 o. contrary to the terms of the REPC. 
The Rl;PC J)royides. that the earn~ mon·ey was to be held in esaow untB closing, and 
cJoslr,g coµJd hot have. oc¢urted prior .to Septernoer· 7, 2001 (30 days after the city 
. . 
authorized the permits). The Plaintitfp were. not notmed_by certified man that the plats were 
. . 
r~ett. II was not~nbl August 3 -when·the· Plaintlffs notified Va!Jey View of their intent 
·t(i -i;a~l t,ha iraosa~on - ~t they learned tha, the earnest money had been taken 
. mtmths earlier .. 
. . 
. "'!h~ft occu~-When a person •oo.tsin•s or. exercises unauth~~ control over the 
·p"top~ of·ao~er With a purpose to deprive him thereat.• Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. 
. . 
Tire Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Barnes (through Valley View} stole the Plaintiffs' $704,000 
. . 
~-me~t m~11ey deposit_. The Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Sames was aware that he was not 
entitied to thtt esc;:row money, evidenced by the fact that he did not provide a copy of the. 
. . . 
REPC's escrowinsblJctionsto SurefyTrtla Mr. Barnes also told the escrawofficerthatthe 
i:npney was.bis c)Wn when it was·no~ 
Mr .. Barnes; first coan\ers that there is no provision in the REPC prohibltlng Valley 
View's usa of the earnest money. The REPC provides: "No later than ten days after 
n®1ication pf recotrlation of the fi.nal. pl.at. each r135eM1tl0n deposit will be converted to 
ll 
1~ 
-----------------------------~ 
4i. 
E$nest money [.r Cleany. the fact that the contract provides for how the lll?"ey shall be 
used is an implicit message ·that the money may not be used for other purposes. 
Mr. Barnes ne)d claims that the Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for theft because 
tHey did not have the earnest money in their, possession at the time it was taken. See 
F/bro T nJsl. lJic. v.: BnitnM Fi11ancial, Inc.. 97 4 P .2d 288 (Utah 1999) (claimant must show 
h$ was immediately ~titfed to possessipn of the property at the time of the alleged theft). 
l1us atgutnent is unavailing. The Plaintiffs had the right to a refund of their earnest money 
until the pJats·were IT;'tt:.orded. Mr. Barnes look the money from the acco~t prior to tfle 
recording of the plats.. 
The Court conctud~ that the Plaintiffs have demonsbated sufficient evidence to 
poov.s the elements of theft. Mr. stertmg and VaDey Vlew unlawfully took 1he earnest 
1T1Imey, ~rivin~ the Plalntiffs of their property. 
Fraud 
The Plaintiffs aroue that Mr. Bames (and VaDey Vlew) committed fraud by 
m\srepresentatlon. Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of CMI Procedure, specifies that daims of fraud 
s!}cflt be stated with parlicularityi The eletnents of fraud are: 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently 
exiSttng material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, 
knowil)Q that there was lnSUffldent knowledge upon which to 
base such a representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party. acting 
reas.onablyand In Ignorance of its falsity, (n cfJd In fact rely_ 
upm fl. (8) and 'WaS thereby Induced to act (9) to that party's 
Jnjury·and damage. 
Alm9d Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 1J 16, 70 P.3d 35 {citations omltted). 
. . 
Fll"St, the Plaintiffs clalm that Mr. Bames made false representations to Induce them 
12 • 
• 
• 
Toe standard of pro6f for estabf1Shlng a daim ct fraud is clear and convincing 
evii;lence. PMce v. Bear River Mul fns. Co., 2002 UT 68, 1l 41, 5$ P .3d 524; 536. The 
.Court cannot determine with certainty Mr. Bames's intent regarding the earnest money 
when he executed-the REPC with the Plaintiffs. This determination must be left to the trier 
offacl 
The Plalntlffs ·rtext aigtie that Mr. Barnes committed fraud by misrepresentation 
thtough n0/1-<:llsc:(osura, specifically that ha failed to ?isclosa the following; the Defendants 
were structuring the land sa1e·as a "flip"; Mr. Seegmiller would b'e financially compensated 
intetum for convincing the Plaintiffs to deposit the earnest money; Mr. Barnes did not have 
Iha financial means to develop ·the property as_ he had represented; and the Plaintiffs' 
earnest money had been take,i and used for anolh';lr purpos·e. 
Toe PJalntiffs argue that Mr. Barnes had a duty to speak because he was in a 
stlpenor pos!Uon lo knowthij material facts around the purchase. Fraudulent concealment 
l"eq!!Jres .a showing that on~ with a _duty or obligation to communicate certain facts 
remained silent.or concealed material facts. ·such a duty or obligation may arise from a 
relationship of trost between the -parties, an inequality of knowledge or power between the 
pal-ties, or other ;;ittendant circumstances lntlicaling reliance[.]" McDougal v. Weed, 945 
13 
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Prqving fraud carries a heavy burden. _The Courtdetermin~ that the Plaintiffs have 
nlllt established clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent concealmenl There remain 
i$Ues of facfregardhig what information Mr. Barnes actual)y·passed on to the Plaintiffs. 
Tli:a Court reserves this ~ue for the jury. 
Negligent Misrepresentation 
Mr. Barnes kept the Plaintiffs apprised of the estimated limeffne forlhe development 
project. Sp¢tlfically, .ha updated the Pfaintitfs ih November and December 2006 and 
J,.n.uary 2007. The d.ate of com!Jletion was matenal to the Plaintiffs because tliey hoped 
lo'. resell the. develop.eel lots While Ura real estate market was high. Mr. Barnes told the 
Plaintiffs that the lots. would be ready for resale as early as June 2007, but that was · 
Incorrect. 
TM PJ;iil'rtiffs rioW da~. that Mr. Bal)les did .not have experience a~~ developer or 
eriou!ih information to. make such promises. Negligent misrepresentation occurs when: 
(1) one having a pec:unia,Y inle.rest in a ttansaction, (2) is in a 
superior posiUon to 'know material facts, and (3) carelessly or 
negfigently makes a false representation concerning them, (4) 
·expecting the other party to rely an'd act thereon, and (5) the 
o1h'ei" party reasonably does so :m!f (6) suffers loss in that 
transaction, the representor cal) be held responsible if the other 
elements of-f!Jlud are also present 
Dt$ry v. Valley Mo.rig. Co., 835 P .2d 1000, 1008 (Utah Ct App. 1992) (citation omitted}. 
N~ligentmisrepr.esentatlo.n Games a lesser mental state th_an fraud, "requiring only that the 
selfernct carelessly or negngently." Robinson v. Trfpco Inv., /he., 2000 UT App 200, ,r 13, 
21 f>.3d 21!;1 .• 
The Plaintiffs aryl)e that Mr, Barnes was in a superior position to know the facts 
14 . 
-because he took it upon hbnself to keep the Plaintiffs updated on the project and he signed 
~ ·c1Dslng papers on behalf ofVaUeyVlew. Mr. Sames disagrees that he was in a superior 
~itfon. It apJ)eW's to the Court that Mr. Barnes held himself out to possess pertinent 
infbrmation that was· rn•rial to the Plaintiffs, and he passed along relevant information at 
various tirQes- fhrougoout.the transaction. He ~s, to some extent. In a superior position 
a(1J:I ma<le-~ mJsrepresentations to the Plaintiffs. Howe~er. whether those 
representations were negligent 'fs as yet uncertaln. The Court does ~ot have sufficient 
information to detertnlria wttethet Mr. Bames~s rep~entations regan:ling the estimated 
cotnp!C!tion date.s were reas.onable. An inconect guess is ~ot necessarily negligent This 
issbe is left for 'dete'imi~atioil by·the jUry. 
Col)t;pirsr:y 
The Plaintiffs ·dafm that Mr. Bames, Valley View, and Mr. SeegmOler conspired to 
eo¢rce ~ PJaimiffs t> e~the REPO and deposit the earnest money t~to an escroW 
ae¢aunt. which would then be used by Valley View to obtain a loan to acquire the Herriman 
property. 
-Conspiracy requires the following elements: •c1) a combination of two or more 
pecsons, (2) an object to ba accompfisJ)ed, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or 
~~ of action. (4) one Qr more unlawfu~ 011ert acts, and (5) damages as a proximal~ 
result thereof.■ lstilel Pag_en Estate V, Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Cl App. 1987). 
l'he Plaf"ntlffs claim that the theft of their money could not have occurred unless both 
Mr .. Seegmiller and Mr. ~bS faile~ to provide REPCs to Surety and Mr. Barnes 
mhu'epresented ~ sowce of th!i money to the escrcm officer. 
Again. the material. facts are disputed and the Court cannot detemune whether 
1.S 
-----------------------------------~ 
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S~JT111ler had a .roeeting of the minds to defraud the Plaintiffs. Just because two steps 
rrraJ be required to achieve a •certain outcome does not necessan1y ~ean that commission 
of th0$'8 two s~ps was intentional in relation to one another. . 
CONCLUSION 
Forthaforegoing reasons._thaCourt: (1) DENIESin part(clalmforflduclaryduty) and 
GRANTS. in pail (claim for negligence) Plain~ ' Mo~on for Partlal SUmmary Judgment 
Concerning Rebert E.. SeegmJl1er. (2) GRANTS 1n·part (claimforflduciary duty) and DENIES 
in part (dab:n for negligence) Robert Seegmiller's ctoss Motion for Partial Summary 
J~gment, (3)" GRANTS Robert Seegrri11Jer's Motion to Sbike, (4) GRANTS ~obert 
·S.e4'gmlllel's 'Motibh"toAmen~ (5} GRANTS in part (claim for theWconversion) and QENIES 
in part (clalms for fra1;1d, negDgent representation and conspiracy) Plaintiffs• Motion for 
SU{nmary Juclgment Concerning Valley View E~tes. LLC and Sterting Bames. and (6) 
GRANTS in part(c~ for fraud. negligent misrepresentation and conspiracy) and DENIES 
in.~art (~Im for theftlconversion)Sterfing Barnes and y~neyView Estates, LLC's Motion for 
Sutnmmy Judgment 
DA TED this _!!day of October. 2011. 
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